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Defendant: Finnicum, Peggy Jean
State of Idaho vs. Peggy Jean Finnicum
Date

Code

User

Judge

9/26/2005

NEWC

MCCANDLESS New Case Filed BAC .26.25

To Be Assigned

BNDS

MCCANDLESS Bond Posted Surety (Amount 1000.00 )

To Be Assigned

NODF

MCCANDLESS Notice To Defendant

To Be Assigned

AFPC

MCCANDLESS Affidavit Of Probable Cause

To Be Assigned

ADFS

MCCANDLESS Advisory Form & Notice Of Suspension

To Be Assigned

ORPC

MCCANDLESS Order Finding Probable Cause

Eugene A. Marano

HRSC

MCCANDLESS Hearing Scheduled (Pre-Trial
Conference/Arraignment 1011112005 08:30 AM)
MCCANDLESS Notice of Pretrial Conference

To Be Assigned

-

To Be Assigned

NANG

CARROLL

Notice of Appearance, Plea of Not Guilty &
Demand For Jury Trial

To Be Assigned

DRQD

CARROLL

Defendant's Request For Discovery

To Be Assigned

DMSC

CARROLL

Demand For Sworn Complaint

To Be Assigned

MNLl

CARROLL

Motion In Limine

To Be Assigned

MNSP

CARROLL

Motion To Suppress

To Be Assigned

HRVC

CARROLL

Hearing result for Pre-Trial
ConferenceIArraignmentheld on 1011112005
08:30 AM: Hearing Vacated

To Be Assigned

PLNG

CARROLL

To Be Assigned

PRSD

JOKELA

Plea Of Not Guilty
Plaintiffs Response To Request for Discovery

PRQD

JOKELA

Plaintiffs Request For Discovery

To Be Assigned

10/18/2005

MOTN

MOLLETT

Amended Motion To Suppress

To Be Assigned

10/28/2005

ADMR

MITCHELL

Administrative assignment of Judge

Penny E. Friedlander

HRSC

MITCHELL

Hearing Scheduled (Pre-Trial Conference
12/23/2005 10:30 AM)

Penny E. Friedlander

HRSC

MITCHELL

Penny E. Friedlandel

MITCHELL

Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial Scheduled
01/09/2006 08:30 AM) 1/9-1113
Notice of Pre-Trial Conference and Trial

STRS

MITCHELL

Speedy Trial Limit Satisfied

Penny E. Friedlander

111112005

MNDQ

CARROLL

Motion To Disqualify Eugene A Marano

Eugene A. Marano

11/3/2005

DlSA

MITCHELL

Disqualification Of Judge Marano - Automatic

Eugene A. Marano

11/14/2005

HRSC

CRUSH

NOHG

JOKELA

Hearing Scheduled (Motion to SuppresslLimine Penny E. Friedlander
12/15/2005 04:OO PM) LOATS 20 MIN
Penny E. Friedlander
Notice Of Hearing

SUBF

JREYNOLDS

Subpoena Returnlfound Shane T Vrevich

Penny E. Friedlander

SUBF

JREYNOLDS

Subpoena Returnlfound Jonathan Mcfarland

Penny E. Friedlander

12/9/2005

SUBF

MO'REILLY

Subpoena Returnlfound-Arthur M Finnicum

Penny E. Friedlander

12/15/2005

HRHD

HAMILTON

Hearing result for Motion to SuppresslLimine held Penny E. Friedlander
on 12/15/2005 04:OO PM: Hearing Held LOATS
20 MIN

9/29/2005

9/30/2005

10/6/2005

11/29/2005

-

To Be Assigned

Penny E. Friedlander
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Defendant: Finnicurn, Peggy Jean
State of Idaho vs. Peggy Jean Finnicurn
Date

Code

User

1211912005

PNTS

CRUSH

Points And Authorities from Fred Loats

Penny E. Friedlander

12/23/2005

HRHD

CRUSH

Hearing result for Pre-Trial Conference held on
12/23/2005 10:30 AM: Hearing Held

Penny E. Friedlander

CONT

CRUSH

Hearing result for Jury Trial Scheduled held on
01/09/2006 08:30 AM: Continued 119-1113

Penny E. Friedlander

WAlV

CRUSH

Waiver Of Speedy Trial

Penny E. Friedlander

HRSC

CRUSH

Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial Scheduled
02/21/2006 08:30 AM) 2-22 TO 2-24
Notice of Hearing

Penny E. Friedlander

12/29/2005

CRUSH
1/12/2006

PBRF

CRUSH

1/13/2006

HRSC

CRUSH
CRUSH

Penny E. Friedlander

Plaintiffs Brief in Opposition of Motion to
Penny E. Friedlander
Suppress
Hearing Scheduled (Decision 02/03/2006 08:30 Penny E. Friedlander
AM) ON MOTION TO SUPPRESS
Penny E. Friedlander
Notice of Hearing

THOMAS

Subpoena Returnlfound Arthur Finnicurn
01-19-06
Subpoena Returnlfound--Shane Vrevich

Penny E. Friedlander

SUBF

THOMAS

Subpoena Returnlfound--Jonathan Mcfarland

Penny E. Friedlander

HRHD

CRUSH

Hearing result for Decision held on 02/03/2006
08:30 AM: Hearing Held ON MOTION TO
SUPPRESS MOTION DENIED
Hearing result for Jury Trial Scheduled held on
02/21/2006 08:30 AM: Hearing Vacated 2-22
TO 2-24
Motion to Set for Disposition

Penny E. Friediander

112312006

SUBF

THOMAS

112512006

SUBF

2/3/2006

Judge

Penny E. Friedlander

-

2/21/2006

2/27/2006

HRVC

CRUSH

MOTN

CRUSH

HRSC

CRUSH
CRUSH

Hearing Scheduled (Sentencing 04/28/2006
03:OO PM)
Notice of Hearing

Penny E. Friedlander

Penny E. Friedlander
Penny E. Friedlander
Penny E. Friedlander
Penny E. Friedlander

4/27/2006

NOHG

MCCANDLESS Amended Notice Of Hearing

4/28/2006

CONT

CLAUSEN

Hearing result for Sentencing held on 04/28/2006 Penny E. Friedlander
03:OO PM: Continued

5/4/2006

HRSC

CLAUSEN

Hearing Scheduled (Sentencing 07/13/2006
01:30 PM) 30 MIN

711012006

7/21/2006

Penny E. Friedlander

CLAUSEN

Notice of Hearing

Penny E. Friedlander

MOTN

CRUSH

Motion to Continue Sentencing

Penny E. Friedlander

ORDR

CRUSH

Order to Continue Sentencing

Penny E. Friedlander

CONT

CRUSH

Hearing result for Sentencing held on 07/13/2006 Penny E. Friedlander
01:30 PM: Continued 30 MIN

HRSC

CRUSH

Hearing Scheduled (Sentencing 07/21/2006
04:15 PM)

HRVC

HAMILTON

Hearing result for Sentencing held on 07/21/2006 Penny E. Friedlander
04:15 PM: Hearing Vacated AND MOTION TO
RECONSIDER

Penny E. Friedlander
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Defendant: Finnicum. Peggy Jean
State of Idaho vs. Peggy Jean Finnicum
Date

Code

User

Judge

7/21/2006

GLN

HAMILTON

ORDR

HAMILTON

STDR

RICKARD

Conditional Plea of Guilty
Penny E. Friedlander
Order Approving and Accepting Conditional Plea Penny E. Friedlander
of Guilty
John P. Luster
Statement Of Defendant's Rights -- DUI

BNDE

RICKARD

Surety Bond Exonerated (Amount 1,000.00)

John P. Luster

GLTY

RICKARD

John P. Luster

SNPF

RICKARD

John P. Luster

-

PROB

RlCKARD

JDMT

RICKARD

Guilty Plea Or Admission Of Guilt GT
(118-8004(1)(A)(.20) {M) Driving Under The
lnfluence (excessive))
Sentenced To Pay Fine (118-8004(1)(A)(.20){M)
Driving Under The Influence (excessive))
Sentenced To Incarceration (118-8004(1)(A)(.20)
{M) Driving Under The lnfluence (excessive))
Confinement terms: Jail: 365 days. Suspended
jail: 315 days. Discretionary: 30 days.
Probation Ordered (118-8004(1)(A)(.20) {M)
Driving Under The lnfluence (excessive))
Probation term: 2 years. (Supe~iSed)
Judgment

SPRO

RlCKARD

Supervised Misdemeanor Probation Order

John P. Luster

APDC

MORELAND

Appeal Filed In District Court

Penny E. Friedlander

MOTN

MORELAND

Penny E. Friedlander

APDC

MORELAND

Motion for stay of execution of sentencing
pending appeal
Appeal Filed In District Court

ADMR

MORELAND

Administrative assignment of Judge

John P. Luster

STAT

RICKARD

John P. Luster

ORDR

CLAUSEN

712612006

EST1

CAMPBELL

Case status changed: closed pending clerk
action
Order Staying Execution of the Sentence
Pending Appeal
Estimate Of Transcript Costs

8/14/2006

BNDC

MORELAND

8/31/2006

MlSC

CARROLL

911412006

NLTR

CAMPBELL

LODG

CAMPBELL

BNDV

CAMPBELL

BNDV

CAMPBELL

RICKARD

7/24/2006

7/25/2006

-

Bond Posted Cash (Receipt 709196 Dated
8/14/2006 for 130.00)Law Library transcript
PROBATIONER STATUS
Notice of Lodging Transcript - Motion to
Suppress and Oral Decision
Lodged Transcript Motion to Suppress and Oral
Decision
Bond Converted (Transaction number 9493510
dated 9/14/2006 amount 117.00)
Bond Converted (Transaction number 9493511
dated 9/14/2006 amount 13.00)
Receipt Of Transcript Motion To Suppress And
Oral Decision
Receipt Of Transcript

911512006

RECT

912 112006

RECT

HAMILTON

9/25/2006

BRFA

MCCANDLESS Brief Of Appellant

-

John P. Luster
John P. Luster

John P. Luster

Penny E. Friedlander

Penny E. Friedlander
John P. Luster
John P. Luster
John P. Luster
John P. Luster
John P. Luster
John P. Luster
John P. Luster
John P. Luster
John P. Luster
John P. Luster
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Defendant: Finnicum, Peggy Jean
State of Idaho vs. Peggy Jean Finnicum
Date

Code

User

1011212006

NOTS

CAMPBELL

Notice Of Settling Transcript On Appeal

1011712006

STAT
HRSC

WATKINS
WATKINS

Case status changed: reopened
John P. Luster
Hearing Scheduled (Appeal Hearing 02/01/2007 John P. Luster
03:30 PM)
John P. Luster
Notice of Hearing

WATKINS

Judge
John P. Luster

BRFR

MCCANDLESS Brief Of Respondent

John P. Luster

BRIE

MCCANDLESS Reply Brief
Hearing result for Appeal Hearing held on
BOOTH
02/01/2007 03:30 PM: Interim Hearing Held

John P. Luster
John P. Luster
John P. Luster

MOTN

MCCANDLESS Objection to Defendant's Proposed Order on
Appeal
BOOTH
Motion for reconsideration notice of hearing

John P. Luster

MEMO

BOOTH

Memorandum in support of motion for
reconsideration

John P. Luster

ORDR

BOOTH

Order on appeal

ORDR

BOOTH

Order on Appeal

John P. Luster
John P. Luster

APSC

OREILLY

Appealed To The Supreme Court

John P. Luster

REMT

WATKINS

Remittitur

John P. Luster

RMAN

WATKINS

Remanded

John P. Luster

RMAN

WATKINS

Remanded
*******+**ACCOUNT IS IN
COLLECTIONS*"****"** - Step 1, Failure to Pay
Fines and Fees - Charge # 1, Driving Under The
Influence (excessive) Appearance date:
4/3/2007
Order Rescinding Remittitur
Hearing Scheduled (Hearing After Appeal
0411912007 08:30 AM) 20 min

Penny E. Friedlander
Penny E. Friedlander

INHD
OBJT

OREILLY

ORDR

WATKINS

HRSC

CRUSH
CRUSH

HRVC

CRUSH

NAPL

OREILLY

Notice of Hearing

John P. Luster
Penny E. Friedlander
John P. Luster
Penny E. Friedlander

Hearing result for Hearing After Appeal held on
04/19/2007 08:30 AM: Hearing Vacated 20 min
Notice Of Appeal Due Date From Supreme Court John P. Luster

*.
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IDAHO UNIFORM CITATION
1ST
JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE
THE STATE OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF
STATE OF IDAHO
COMPLAINT AND SUMMONS
vs.
)
Infraction Citation
/ = m d ~ ~ C ~ h / \
)
OR
iae ~ s m e
)
Misdemeanor Citation
1
U Acctdent Involved
)
Fml ~ e m e
~ i ~b dt e le
Cornpanton Cttatton
Attached

1

w

a

a
-
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d
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07
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3~4a

•
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Operator
Class A [Zl Class 5
Class C B C l a s s D
Other,
+ 25 33
GVWR 26001 +
16+ persons
Placard Hazardous Mater 1s D R I ~
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~~tui.s.63
S3664
Home Address
h)
lTCIIL)
Phone # =(3-?)3*
Business Address C E U ~ ~ & ' V M W~,_ I Y ~ Q ~ L
THE UNDERSIGNED OFFICER (PARTY)HEREBY CERTIFIES AND SAYS:.
rounds, and belleve the above-named Defendant,
DL or SS#
S t a l e I
~
Eyes
DOB
tielghtrS;\
Wt
Hatr
(i
State
Yr of Veh~clew ~ a k e
CMU
Veh L a #
Model
l&7 f , P
Dld comrntt the following act@)on 0
at -L!,&&d
o'clock
M

Cf

0

C7

C7
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1. x
36

OfftcedParty
Date

Ser~al#/Address

Wltnesstng Offlcer
Senal #/Address
THE STATE OF IDAHO TO THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT

Dlstrict Court of

KOOTENAl

Dept

I

'/ILENE

.

on the

, 20 - at

1

Dept

Idaho.
day of
o'clock -M

I acknowledge receipt of this summons and I promise to appear at the time indicated.
Z

Oelendsnts Signature

"2

tm

Ihereby certify service upon the defendant personally on

.20-

v
C

2

Gilicer

NOTICE: See reverse side of your copy for PENALTY and COMPLIANCE instructions.

COURT COPY VIOLATION #I

!

Departmental Report #

0

- 25 \ 5 3
?@)
~ 5 - i

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE
JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF?@&&?'&,&$ 9:26

.

THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

'\q 31

F-i,k!NiCk~,?&@eY
3

~

d,

COURT CASE NUMBER CM/O~$
PROBABLE CAUSE AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT
OF WARRANTLESS ARREST AND /OR REFUSAL TO
SUBMIT TO / FAILURE OF EVIDENTIARY TEST

DOB
SSN
DL#
State
State of Idaho,
County of

KCnrC~~lt-7

. M%A
t ~ ~ r r S 3
I, W?. 3%.
that:
(print)

, the undersigned, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says

a,

1. I am a peace officer employed by ! ~ ' D c , ~ F ~ J /3Q.
~z
2. The defendant was arrested on
~ X C E S TOE
S
hu T ,

~ / ~ s / D s at &%

ClAM WPM for the offense (s) IC /S-%C~3'1(c>

and /or of driving while under the influence of alcohol, drugs or any other intoxicating pursuant to Section 18-8004
Idaho Code.
Second or more DUI offense in the last five years? ClYES haNO ClFELONY CiqMISDEMEANOR
3. Location of Occurrence: 4
/%
Z \
C
+ -

by: (check box)
4. Identified the defendant as: (print name) F T M ,QZCh k P E ~ Y
C 3E R h )
ClMilitary ID ClState ID Card OStudent ID Card b ~ r i v e r License
s
ClCredit Cards
ElPapexwork found BVerbal ID by defendant
identified defendant.
Witness FTN?\llcu.rv\.Ak-r&.tR . MW$& LOther

5. Actual physical control established by: &Observation by affiant q Observation by Officer
, Cl Statement of Witness:
U Admission of Defendant to
0 Other:
6. I believe that there is probable cause to believe the defendant committed such crime because of the following
(NOTE: You must state the source of all information provided below. State what you observed and
facts:
what you learned fiom someone eIse, identifying that person):
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PROBABLE CAUSE FOR STOP AND ARREST: f)& o'i/15/& 5 47 ~ 3 P b z /%a\
.
URS 2 \ A > \ < <WJC
J
GN~,O ~ $ / Z S bfIiOirui&Y
R M . F T N U ~ ~7!f(
M h u h k4 7 5 goN 47 -.c

-

,

6

/

3&51 L G W 7M- /~MZ~>&&?bd~vr&:c?
A Ulr)-LTc ?t&V'i &L+~+R. + R ~ I \9420 Th'eTsK- w 4s bPWkZu b A-I/_R!+oL'JI (
PCge'i i)fir,\x u p ,n 7 4 PFWDFNCC
~
onevzhm &L &&A= 11N N Z G I W& S ~ A - I Ce ~TD~ J
a
1
0.A h 1 3
ULR&~L\%~\-IC%I%RVZL&J
bk.) CDOL~) 54
' + 6 R @iw7
1
/r$40
. E 8 K V Do I%dT.s.&b
D.U. I. NOTES
d e s ONO
Gaze Nystagmus
m e s ClNo
Odor of alcoholic beverage
Admitted drinking alcoholic beverage
m e s ONo
Walk & Turn
[TYkes ONo
ClNo
One Leg Stand
ET'es
ClNo
Slurred speech
El'&:
ClNo
hpaired memory
&es
ONO
Accident Involved
UYes d o
Glassy/bloodshot eyes
Inju,ry
Dyes &o
Other
UNFCW

-

-

Drugs Suspected
ayes d o
Reason Drugs are Suspected .#/A

Drug Recognition Evaluation Performed UYes !3%o

Prior to testing, defendant was substantially informed of the consequences of refusal and failure of the test as
required by Section 18-8002 and 18-8002A, Idaho Code.
Defendant was tested for alcohol concentration, drugs or other intoxicating substances. The test (s) waslwere
performed in compliance with Section 18-8003 & 18-8004(4) Idaho Code and the standards and methods adopted
by the Department of Law Enforcement.
by: RBreath Instrument Type:Wntoxilyzer 5000 OAlco Sensor Instrument Serial #d6-3~&1
ClBlood And/or ClUrine Test Results Pending? Yes NO (Attached)
Name of person administering breath test:~b.T,k.M4 FARUMb Date Certification Expires: 04. /30/07
Defendant refused the test as follows:
-

By my signature and in the presence of a person authorized to administer Oaths in the State of Idaho, I hereby
solemnly swear that the information contained in this document and attached reports and documents that may be
included herein is true and correct to the best of my information and belief.
Dated:

cS=l/~s/&j'

Signed: i)GP, J .h.W' F h R W D
(affiant)

Subscribed and sworn to before me on

0
(Date)

,,,\!\I~~III~,

6.G R F ~ ' / / ,

," 0.....-.. .O 5 (or)
5
PERSON AUTHORIZGD
5
,\\

3 .

TP;.LOTARY... =
ADMINISTEROAT@.
--- .. ,-- .... *--Title:

.

-.

B,

,'/%+. '.
$'7

//,

4 f I . l ~

,

..

......"+O

E OF \
o!,\\'

' ~ 1 1 1I , \ \ \

.
$
.-

22 5 6
p
NOTARY PUBLIC ~ 7 IDAHO
0 ~

- &,

Residing at: k'Cs0
My Commission expires:
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Booking #
Date

Name ID #

ARRESTEE:
Name F1hIb-J\' ZC .!A

i ;-BOOKING
INFORMATION Sh,-..
Accepted by: 2
27
KOOTENAI COUNTY PUBLIC SAFETY BUILDING Agency Report # 0S -25 I 3 ?
BAC
I ,2c
09
C;
Warrant Check
Prob. Check
Prob. Officer

.ad

/x,/o

p ~ ~ e v

Last

564 N

Firs1

Locker # 3 CIA
Location
Hold For:
For DUI Charge:
Was Call Requested
Was Call Made

Middle

AKA
Address
City

/ti 2;3

3).
I ~ ~ C C Z ~ ~ LbF R
-W
.

) ) Q ~ Tr A L ( S

ST

7 7 3 -7399
CityIState of Birth Ailh)ll&~,M
D.L. # e ~ a 0 6 2 9 6
b

h-b

Zip

C638S C(

-S

Home Phone

T

DOB

LD

State

Occupation TF&\t&lL

PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION:
Height 5
(1 " weight&
S e x F air- ~
~
Race Ld
Glasses Y @ Contacts Y /@ Facial Hair PA
Scars, Marks, Tattoo's .%AIL

aU L G = T 5 ; b c

P 4 d ;S @KC"-(
ARRESTING OFFICER INFORMATION:
Clothing Description ?4 LL&

Date ITime of Arrest O ~ / Z / O S
Arresting Officer k?.
5 .n.M%&ILI

1
.&dl)

os

~A,&

e

s

Work Phone #SCF(-u%-Y\&)
m

~ - 6 4 - KE Y L

d ~64?6ti3~Ic?.T

17 qq
I

!:

'J4UC-Y

~mpio~er(@

235C)

Agency

iocationl68L 3 7 .x-LUX3-A
Dk.
Arrival at PSB
K G l)

Dist 'i I

/q/?

Is the arresting officer aware oi any menral or pnys~ca!conditions this inmate may have which might affect hisiher safety or
No, d y e s (Explain) 74&3
? b ~ ,, - x i t - T m
ability to be held without special attention oy jail staff?
r,;7< G F T &

- ,-

VEHICLE INFORMATION:
qenlc;e ~ j c . Ki63 i o d
7 g c-69
V~hlcieDisposition &fi

-

CITIZEN ARREST:

Y w a k eC
4.72.2
&

H Y

-

Model UitZC+? ?day ? l)PCo~or(s)jJ>tlETG
. .. LL'. 2-m-nCl i(i.j QR. &37-D
&
/%%

i hereby arrest the a ~ o v enamed suspect on the chargels) indicated and request a peace

JAIL S i R t i 355 iiev :liO?

8

KOOTENAI COUNTY JAIL
INTOXILYZER - ALCOHOL ANALYZER
SN 66-003460
SOLUTION LOT NO.
09/25/2005
SUB NAME=
EGGY,J
SUB DOB
O.L.N.=ID/GT206286B
OPER NAME=MCFARLAND,JON,R
ARREST AGENCY=2800
TEST
AIR BLANK
INTERNAL STANDARDS
AIR BLANK
SIM CHK #0023
ACCEPTABLE
AIR BLANK
SUBJECT TEST
AIR BLANK
SUBJECT TEST
AIR BLANK

BrAC
.oo
PASSED
.oo
.075

ocj/a.s/os - Pci2-5
TIME FIRST OBSERVED

TIME
19:49 PDT
1 9 5 0 PDT
19:50 PDT
19:51 PDT
19:51
19:52
19:52
19:53
19:53

PDT
PDT
PDT
PDT
PDT

KOOTENAt COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPAR IMENT
ADDITIONAL PROPERTY1 NARRATIVE CONTINUATION

1

I

I

I Video Cassette. Maxell T-120. black, standard VHS, contact with (5) Peggy J Finnicum, start of tape:
18:17- end of tape.

,

1) (WIRP) Finnicum, Arthur Michael, WIM, 01104186,18363 W. Riverview Dr. Post Falls, ID 83854,773-7849.
(M) Dep. S. Vrevich, KCSD, 2359.

'
/

I

1

2) On the public roadway located on Riverview Dr., cross of Pleasant View Rd., near the City of Post Falls,
Kootenai County, State of Idaho 83854.

I

I

I 3) On 09/25/05 at approx. 1756 hours Ialong with (M) Dep. Vrevich were dispatched to respond to a possible

I

domestic dispute at 18363 W. Riverview Dr. While enroute to the call Dispatch notified us that the female half
had left the scene driving a white Chevy Blazer and was possibly intoxicated. Dep. Vrevich was checking the
area and also advised Post Falls of a possible intoxicated driver. Iarrived on scene at approx. 1810 hours
were I met, (WIRP) Arthur M. Finnicum. Arthur and his girlfriend were waiting at the top of his driveway on
Riverview Rd. to speak with me reference the possible domestic dispute.
Arthur said that he and his mother, (S) Peggy J. Finnicum got into a verbal argument earlier that evening
because Arthur believed that she needed to stop drinking. Arthur said that Peggy got upset and said, "Fuck
you!" repeatedly. Arthur said he did not know what to do so he called his father for advice. Arthur said his
father told him to call the police. Arthur said when he called the police Peggy left the house driving her white
Chevy Blazer. Arthur said that Peggy had been drinking alcoholic beverages all day and he believed that she
was highly intoxicated.
While I was speaking to Arthur at approx. 182f hours, Isaw Peggy drive up in her white Chevy Blazer
travelling eastbound on Riverview Dr. I flagged Peggy down and told her to pull into the driveway so Icould
speak to her. While Iwas speaking to her I could smell the strong odor of an alcoholic beverage on her breath.
I advised her to drive down the driveway in a safe area so I could do some further investigation. Peggy was
slurr~ngher speech, had glassy and blood shot eyes, and seemed confused.
I asked Peggy to step out of the vehicle. Peggy stepped out of the vehicle. Itold Peggy to stay by her car so I
could speak to Arthur. Peggy continued to say, 'What are you doing here" Iadvised Peggy that I was here to
investigate a domestic dispute between her and her son, Arthur. lalso advised Peggy that she appeared to be
tntoxtcated and she was driving her vehicle on a public roadway.

While 1 was speaktng to Arthur. Peggy went tnto the house. Dep. Vrevich arrived on scene to assist me in my
investigation. I advised Dep. Vrevich that Peggy went into the house when she was told to stay outside. Dep.
Vrevlch and I entered the house through the front door to reestablish contact with Peggy.
Peggy said that she did not know what was gotng on and she said she did not know what was wrong with her
drivrng her vehicle after she had a couple of drinks. Peggy said that she went to the Stateline to buy a pack of
ctgarettes and came back home. I told Peggy that I believed that she was Intoxicated and that Iwould need to
do some Standardized Field Sobriety Tests on her. Peggy agreed and I conducted the following tests an a
level gravel driveway outside of Peggy's home

-.
rudY

US

TSA ::

~SiTirrE.l~=nu*.

Dep. J.R McFarland

01 0

KOOTENAI COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPAR I MENT
ADDITIONAL PROPERTY/ NARRATIVE CONTINUATION

yesterday evening. Iasked Peggy if she had any head injuries, eye problems, or physical disabilities. Peggy
advised me that she did not have any head injuries or eye problems, however she said that her left knee was
injured and that she was under a physician's care for it. I asked Peggy if she was able to walk. Peggy said
that she was able to walk, however she said that her knee causes her to be off balance.

I

Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus: Peggy said that she could see the tip of my finger and she understood my
instructions. Peggy started to move her head during the evaluations and Iadvised her not to move her head
and follow the tip of my finger with her eyes and her eyes only. Both eyes tracked equally. Both eyes lacked
smooth pursuit and showed distinct and sustained nystagmus at maximum deviation. Both eyes showed
nystagmus prior to onset of 45 degrees. Ialso noticed that Peggy's eyes were glassy and bloodshot.

Walk and Turn: As l was explaining the walk and turn to Peggy she said that she could not stand with her right
Iadvised Peggy to do the best that she could and not to
' start the test until Itold her to do so. Peggy was swaying back and forth during the instruction phase and
I continued to speak while Iwas giving my instructions. Peggy said that she understood the instructions.
I Peggy stepped off line a total of four times, did not touch heel to toe on any of the steps, she also did not
make a proper turn, and she had her hands raised from her sides during the entire test.

1 foot in front of her left foot because of her bad knee.

One Leg Stand: Peggy said that she understood my instructions. Peggy again said that she could not do the
i test due to her knee injury. I advised Peggy that if her left leg was injured she needed to place that leg in the
i air and stand on her good leg. Peggy fell of balance two times, raised her arms from her sides, and dropped
: her foot at least nine times. Peggy was unable to finish the test.
i

I

1
i
i
!

, Based on my investigation I placed Peggy under arrest for IC 18-8004 Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol.

'

I

Itransported Peggy to PSB. I read Peggy the 18-8002 Advisory Form. Peggy submitted two breath tests on
the lntoxilyzer 5000. Peggy's BAC was 261.25. I read Peggy her Miranda Right's and she said that she did not
want to talk to me. I stopped the interview.
I charged Peggy with IC 18-8004(C)Excessive Driving Under the lnfluence of Alcohol, due to the BAC of
261.25. Cite number 94468.

Attached to the report is a voluntary statement form, filled out by Arthur. The vehicle was not towed and left at
the registered owners home. The VHS tape was entered into KCSD Evidence.

5 ) Radio Call/ Observation
6) None

dl

/

Dep. J.R. McFartand
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KOOTENAI COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT
VOLUNTARY STATEMENT FORM

05-35/33 INCIDE T A kid@ bl*bt? a5s$hA.5,,
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6-?ME:

REPORTNO:
LOCATION: I?? L'?, W.
PERSONS PRESENT:
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I give &is
of my own
will. There have
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I date i

e4-z?d&F
ldarcl

1

Mailing Address

2.

You are required by law to take one or more evidentiary tests to determine the concentration of alcohol or the presence of drugs or other intoxicating
substances in your body, After submitting to the test(s) you may, when practical, at your own expense, have additional tests made by a person of your

3.

You do not have the right to talk to a lawyer before taking any evidentiary tests to determine the alcohol concentration or presence of drugs or other
intoxicating substances in your body.
If you refuse to take or complete any of the offered tests pursuant to Section 18-8002, ldaho Code:
A. Your ldaho driver's license or permit will he seized if you have it in your possession, and if it is current and valid you will be issued a temporary
permit. Non-resident licenses will not be seized and will be valid in Idaho for thirty (30) days from the service of this notice of suspension unless
modified or restricted by the court, provided the license is valid in the issuing state. If you were operating a commercial motor vehicle, any
temporary permit issued will not provide commercial driving privileges of any kind.
County for a hearing to show cause
B. You have a right to submit a written request within seven (7) days to the Magistrate Court of@%TWkr
why you refused to submit to or complete evidentiary testing and why your driver's license should not be suspended.
C. IP you do not request a hearing or do not prevail at the hearing, your license will be suspended by the court with absolutely no driving privileges for
180 days if this is your first refusal; if this is not your first refusal in the last five years, your license will be suspended with absolutely no driving
privileges for one (1) year.
if you take and fail the evidentiary test(s) pursuant to Section 18-8002A, Idaho Code:

4.

5.

B. I will serve you with this NOTICE O F SUSPENSIONthat becomes effective thirty days from the date of service on this NOTICE, suspending
your driver's License orprivileges. If this is your first failure of an evidentiary test your driver's license or driving privileges will be suspended for
ninety (90) days, with absoiukely no driving privileges during the first thirty (30) days. You may request restricted driving privileges for the
remaining sixty (60) days of the suspension. Restricted driving privileges will not allow you to operate a commercial motor vehicle. If this is not
your first failure of an evidentiary test within the last five (5) years, your driver's license or driving privileges will be suspended for one (1) year
with absolutely no driving privileges of any kind during that period.
C. You have the right to an administrative hearing on the suspension before the IDAHO TRANSPORTATION DEPARTMENT to show cause why
you failed the evidentiary test and why your driver's license should not be suspended. The request must be made in writing and be received by the
department within seven (7) calendar days from the date of service of this NOTICE OF SLISPEiVSION. You also have the right to judicial review
of the Hearing Officer's decision.

( S ) IS SEPARATE

A permit was not issued because the license was: D Suspended
Expired

m o t in Possession
O Issued by Another Jurisdiction

0 Invalid
Not Licensed

ORDER FINDING PROBABLE CAUSqqrr,qFp 26
1

The above-named defendant having been arrested without a warrant fo

xc

~S-%OclY

~ ~ G 6 6 D2 c ~h ~). ~

* -

kv

:27
t

[a*

IieM

J

and the Court having examined the &davit of b ~ 3 . .k.
5 MC-FAALA~~,the Court finds
probable cause for believing that said crime(s) has been committed and that the defendant committed said
crime(s), and that helshe may be requirego post bail prior to being released.
DATED this

TIME:

2@

d a y o f w . 2 0 / , F

AMPM

.

Y
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FREDERICK G LO&TS

FREDERICK G. LOATS
Aftorney at Law
111 North 2nd Streel, Suite 300
P.O. Box 831
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
Telephone: (208) 667-6424
Fmr (208)664-3644
ISB No. 2147
Attorney for Defendant

J
N THE DISTRICT COURT OF THF, FIRST JLJDICZAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

1
1
1
1

Case No. CR-MOS-1943 1
Citation No.

1

MOTION IN LTMME

1

VS.

1

PEGGY JEAN F'INNICUM,
Defendant.

)
)
\

Defendant hereby moves the Court for an Order excluding from cvidence at trial the breath
tests conducted upon the Defendant, including any testimony relating thereto, by and for the reason
that the oficer administering said tests Failed to follow prescribed procedure prior to collecting
breath samples from the Defendant, thereby rendering the results unreliable and inadmissable.
DATED this

date of

&.

,2005.

L,
FREDERICK G. LOATS

MOTION IN LIWlNE -I

I

07

FREDERICK G LOkTS

CERTJ,FICATEOF MAILING

#.

I hereby certtfy that on this
,2005, a true and correct copy of
day o f
the foregoing was mailed, postage prepaid, or sent by facsimile or interoffice mail to:
Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney
by fax

L,
FREDERICK G. LOATS

FREDERICK G LOATS

PkGE 09

PREDERTCK G.LOATS
Attorney at Law
I l l North Second Street
P. 0. Box 83I
Coeur &lone, Idaho 83816-0831
Telephone: (208) 667-6424
Fax: (208)664-3644
ISB No. 2147
Attorney for Defendant

IN TI-IE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICML DISTRICT OF T I E
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

1
1

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
VS.

PEGGY JEAN FINNICUM,
j

Defendant.

1
1
1
1

Case No. CR-~05-19431
Citation No.
MOTION TO SUPPRESS

1
1
)

Defendant, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 12(b)(3), ICR, hereby moves the Court for an

Order suppressing any and all evidencc acquired as aresult of the initial dctention of the Defendant,
the subsequent dctention of the Defendant, the search of the Defendant's vehicle. and any evidence
acquired as a result of the subsequcnt arrest of the Defendant, including evidentiary testing and/or
any post-arrest statements, by and for the fallowing reasons:

I.

The initial detention was not supported by a reasonable, &iculable suspicion that

criminal activity was occurring or had occurred, and therefore was in violation of the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article One, g17 of the Idaho
Constitution;
MOTION TO SUPPRESS

-I

FREDERICK G LObTS

2.

The subsequent detention of the Defendant was the product of this unconstitutional

3.

The Defendant's subsequent arrest not supported by probable cause, and therefore

stop;

was in violation of the Fourll~and Fourteenth Amendnlents to the United States Consti,tutionand
Article One, $17 of the Idaho Constitution.
The detention of the Defendant, the arrest of the Defendant, and any evidence acquired as a
rcsult of t11.e Defendant's arrest, including any evidentia~ytesting and/or post-a-arrest statements
attributed to the Defendant, were therefore obtained in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution and M c l e One, 5 17 of the Idaho Constitution.

DATED this

27

date of

&&

,2005.

Ld
FREDERICK G. LOATS
Attorney for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

&&.

I hereby certify that on the
day of
of the foregoing was mailed postage-prepaid addressed to:

I

,2005, a true and correct copy

Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney
by fic~
Lr

FREDERICK 0. LOATS

II

-

MOTION TO SUPPRESS 2

.

FREDERICK G LOATS

PAGE

FREDERICK G. LOATS
Attorney at Law
111 North Second Street, Ste. 300
P.O. Box 831
Coeur d'AZene, Idaho 83816-0831
Telephone: (208) 667-6424
F a : (208)664-3644
ISB No. 2147
Attorney for Defendant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

STATE OF IDAHO,

1

Plaintiff,

)

1
1
1

VS.

PEGGY J. FINNICUM,

0 5 - / qy3/
Case No. CR-Mr- ' -'

--

AMENDED
MOTION TO SUPPRESS

)

Defendant.

)

Defendant, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 12(b)(3),ICR, by way of supplementation to
hcr previous1y filed Motion to Supprcss, raises the following additional challenge to the searches and
seizures that occurred in this case, to wit:
1.

The peace officers unlawfully and unconstitutionally entered the defendant's home

and removed hcr &om her home, during the course of their contact with the defendant. This entry

was not pursuant to either a search or arrest warrant, and not pursuant to any exception to the warrant
requirement, and therefore unconstitutional, and any evidence acquired as a result must bc
i
I

suppressed.

DATED this

$ date of

%

,2005.

w
t*
FREDERICK
G.LOATS

Attorney for Defendant
I

AMENDED MOTIaN TO SUPPRESS

-1

01

FREDERICK G

LOATS

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

a-

I hereby certify that on the .& day of
of the foregoing was mailed postage-prepaid addressed to:

,2005, a true and correct copy

Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney, Interoffice Mail

w &.LA
rr

*

FREDERICK G.LOA XS

-

AMENDED MOTION TO SUPPRESS 2

11/01/2005

15:50

FREDERICK G LOCTS

12086643644

PAGE

STAX @ IukiG
l(j
COUNTY OF K E T E M J

05

ss

TILED:

FREDERICK 0.ZOATS
Attorney at Lmn,
111 North Second Street, Sne. 300
P. 0. Box 831
Coeur d'Alenc, Idaho 83814
Telephone: (208)667-6424
F': (208) 664-3644
ISB No. 2147
Attorncy for Defendant

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
VS.
PEGGY JEAN FQWXCUM,
Defendant.

1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1

Case No. CR-05-1943 1
MO TZON TO DISQUALIFY
WTHOUT CAUSE

)

1
Pursuant to the provisions of Rule 25(a), I.C.R., Defendant hereby moves for d ~ e
disqualification of the Honorable Eugene A. Maratlo from presiding as Judge in ale above elltided
action.

.
w

L,
FREDERICK G. LOATS
Attorney for Defendant

MOTION TO DISQUALIFY
WITHOUT U USE 1

-

FREDERICK G

LObTS

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
hereby certify that on. the )day of November, 2005, a truc and correct copy of the
foregoing was sent addressed to:
1,

Resident Chambers of Honorable Eugene A. Marano
Magistrate Judge
324 W. Garden Avenue
Coeur d7Alene,Idaho 838 14
Kootenai Prosecuting Attorney, by fax

LI
FREDERICK G. LOATS

MOTION TO DISQUALIFY
WITHOUT U W E - 2
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Identifier

1

Phase of Case

DC 015 COURT MINUTES

024

Page
Identifier

Tape

1
I

IDDQLS

Date

I ~ / / L ; t(-/

Phase of Case

case#

@D-OS-1 4 ~ i 3 1

?_~.1i30

-

DC 018 COURT MINUTES

I

STATE OF IDAHO

case # CR

dDD6-e

/q+s/

se

P EARANCES:
[ Defendant
[ ] Def. Attorn

v

Defendant having failed to appear, and no good cause shown
FAILURE T O APPEAR:
for such absence, IT IS ORDERED: [ ] BOND FORFEITED [ ] BENCH WARRANT, BOND $
[ ] Right to speedy trial waived based on FTA [ ] Trial vacated
[ ] Trial to remain as set'
[ ] Refer to PA for fiirther action
PROCEEDINGS Sr ADVISEMENT OF RIGHTS:
TAPE #
LOG#
[ ] Defendant is informed of the charge(s) against himlher and all legal rights including the right to be
represented by counsel. Defendant understands.
[ 1 Defendant advised of effect of guilty plea and maximum penalties, also penalties for subsequent violations.
Defendant understands.
[ ] Matter Continued
[ ] Charge amended
[ ] Notify the Court, in writing of change in mailing address.
RIGHT T O PRELIMINARY HEARING
[ ] Waived right to Counsel.
SET [ I I4 DAYS [ 121 DAYS
[ ] PH Waived
[ 1 Request Public Defender, sworn to Financial Statement.
/mo till the sum of $
has been paid.
[ ] Reimburse $
[ ] Public Defender Appt'd.
[ ] Public Defender Denied
[ ] ENTRY OF NOT GUILTY PLEA: [ ] Set PTCIJury

[ ] Set Court Trial

BAIL:
[ ] O.R. Release [ ] Released on previously posted bond [ I Bail set at $
NO CONTACT ORDER: [ ] NCO Entered
[ ] NCO not ordered at this time
[ ] Court accepts plea
[ ] ENTERS GUILTY PLEA freely and voluntarily with knowledge of consequences.
. [ ] Defendant ordered to obtain an evaluation prior to sentencing:
[ 1 Set for disposition
[ ] Evaluation Waived.
[ ] Alcohol [ ] Substance Abuse [ ] Batterer.

wEJ.,M J. DOUGLAS
Prosecuting Attorney
501 N. Government Way
P.O. BOX 9000

IN TEE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL, DIfjTNCT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO,IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOQTENAI
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff.
VS.

PEGGY JEAN FINN'ICW

1

1
1
1
j)
1

CASE ~t).
M05-19431
I
BNEE dl OPPOSI?IION OF
MOTION TO SUPPRESS
I

)

Defendant.

1

C b f E S NOW the State, by and through R Reese ~t&tt,Deputy PIosmting
I

Attorney, and hereby files its above entitled fief, The oppoiition to defense motion is
made upon the following grounds:

ARGUMENT

!
i

1

I

In the matter befor'e this Court, Deputy McFarland re.$onded to 18363 Riverview
Drive, K o o b s i County, State of Idaho, in order to bvestigate a possible domestic
battery. Deputy MoFarland spoke with .the &fendantasson, +ur

Finnic-

who told

Deputy McFar1a.d that the defendant Slad left in a white Chevkolet Blazer and that the
I

defendant had been drinking all day and that he believed she $as highly intoxioated.
~ ~ ~ k ~ i m
30aminutes
t e l ~later,'Deputy~ c ~ ~ l04served
a u d the defendant
on a public roadway. Deputy McFml&d was flag$edl&wn and asked to stop in
1

the driveway of the residence. Once Deputy McFarland mad4 contact wi& the defendant,
I

he noted that: 1) she had a strong smell of an alcoholic beverabe on her breath; 2) her
!

speech was slurred; 3) +0 seemed confused; and 4) ha eyes &ere glassy and blood shot.

The defendant was instructed to remain outside, but she ignorb that order and went into
i

I

the house.

Once Deputy Vzevich arrived on scene to assist with h e invwtigaiion, the
I

deputies entered the house with the sole purpose of speaking $ith the defendant and
I

asking ha to come outside so they could wmplete the investikation. The defendant was
!
contacted insideher home and once she was questioned, she &reed to come outside and
I

perform field sobnery tests. &r
det&ed

oompleting the investigatio)~,Deputy McFarland

the defendant into custody.

that she had driven mder the iduenoe and

This case is similar to the facts presented in State v. ~uan~1er.i
State v. Suangler, 130
I
Idaho 944,950 P.2d 1283 (Ct.App. 1997).
I
In State v. Spancrler, the Court of Appeals of JdaZlo hdd that the police could enter

onto a defendant's business premises and enter into that businbs once the police had
established a v&d reason to make a

I

stop. &, 130 idah? at 946,950 P.2d at 1285.

In Suan~~er,
officers stopped and tried to contact the defendant &a they observed him
swerve between two lanes of traffic and aRer making an a b 4 t sharp left hLm intc the
I

driveway of his business.

130 Idaho at 944,950 P.2d at 1483.
i

The officers followed behind the defmdant &a he go? out of his car and asked

him twioe to stop and talk to them.

a While following b

y the def'endaat,the

officers noted that they could smell an odor of alcohol coming! from the defendant. &

I

However, the defend& ignored their instructions to stop and bent into his business.
!
'

.

BRLEE INOPPOSrnON 0P:MOTIONTO SUPPRESS - 2

!

Id.

The officers followed the d&bndant inside and ~

~

c

tto comeback
e d ~outside so
m

that they could complete their investigation.

,

Id.
!

The Court of Appeals of Idaho reasoned that the intqkon was ''very limited"
!

because they were fo11owing someone who had ignored their fepeated instructions to stop
.
.
!
130 Idaho at 945,940 P.2d at 1284. In addition,
and speak with them. Quotar added,

the Court of Appeals of idaho, citing State v. Manthei, held

vt it would &feat the very

purpose of Term to allow the defendant to ggo.intohis businesg one he knew hewas being
detained. and was not fie? to go. & 130 Idaho at 946,950 ~ , h at
d 3285; cittng&&3

i

Manthei, 1130Idaho 237,939 P.2d 556 (1997). And, the CO& of ~ p p e d of
s ldaho found
that this intrusion wasn't as invasive as the i&wio.n

3h MantFi bwause the officers

limited the scope of the&intrusion to making contact with th4 defendant. Id,

In the present matter, Deputy McFar1and and ~ e p u t ~revich
y
went into the
!

defendant's home &a the defendant was instructed to r e m 4 outside for the sole
purpose of contacting the defendant and asking her to eame

bb

outside so they wuld

complete their investigation. Therefore, applying the ruljng b) Suan~lex,the intrusion
!

into the defendant's home was lawful and the evidence should not be suppressed.

For the foregoing reasons, the.Defendaat's Motion should be denied.
DATED this

B%~of January 2006.

Deputy Prosecuting Attorney

-

EWfEINOPPOSITION OF'MO~TONTO SUPPRESS 3

.t/w, true and coned
m

.

2006, a

day of
I here& eew that on the
copy of the foregoing Brief was caused to be &edfmail$%:/
'

!

Frederick Cr. Loats
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 83 t

1
!

j
i
/-

I

j
i

!

Case #

J'JJ'3-/-9 W /

OM :FRED LORTS OFFICE

-ciX NO. :

FREDERICK G. LOA KT
Aaorncy at LOW
2005 Irr~nwoud.?arkway-SUII?2 10
P.0.Box 831

Coeur d'Alcne,10 83814
Telephone: (208) 666%424
Fm:(208)664-3644
LSB No. 2147

Attorney for Defendant

N ?'HEIXSTRlC'I' COURT OP ?'HEFIRST .IUDICIAL DISTKICT OF THE
STA'I'E OF I D M O , IN AND I70R 'ITS CQIJNTY OF KOOTENAI
STATE OF IDAHO.
Plaintiff,
vs.

j
1

MOTION

1

nCSPO1YzTION

1

PEGGY FINNICUM,

Defendant.

.-

Case No. CR-2005-1943 1

TO SET FUR

)

3

Defendant hereby moves the W r t ,foran Order setting this matter for disposition far entry
of a plea and sentencing at a later date and time, by and for the reasat] that counsel lbs Defendant
is unavailable for the Calendar Call set for 8:30 o'clock a.m. on Febwry 21, 2006, due to an

Arraignment before Judge Verby s d for 9:00 o'clock a.m. in Sandpoint, Tdaho, in &te v. Hatch,
Bonner County Case No. CRFO6-402.
DA'T'ED this 'fl_
date dFebnary, 2006.
L.
mEDE'RICK G.LOATS
Attorney for Defendant

P

'

OM :FRED LORTS OFFlCE

CERTIFJCATI3 OF MAILING
1 hereby certi'j that on this
day of Februaty ,2006, a true and conect copy of the
foregoing was served upon the Kootenai County P~osccutingAttorney by fascimile trmmission
to 446-1833.

.-~.Lq
.,*. .--.

Attorney for Defendant

MOTION TO SET FOR
DISPOSITION -2

,dg&

Case #

CP @ n ~
-/91/
s a,/

I

For
For
For

I

I

2

n

/

Date
Tape#

@$ IOW

b1L-lg9

Court Reporter

a pni/~ ,

Time
Judge
a

Cou troom #&

~ ~ d ~ d

FRX NO.

FROM :FRED LORTS OFFICE

:

u l . 10 2006 10:39RM

FREDERICE G.LOATS
Attorney at Law
11 1 North 2nd Street
P. 0. 8o.x 831
Coeur d'Alem, ID 83814

Telephone (208)667-6424
Fizu: (208)664-3644
.ISR Nr,. 2147

Atturney for Defendant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TIE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF IIE
STATE OF IDAHO, TN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTONAl

STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff,

1
1
1\

i

VS.

PEGGY JEAN FINNICUM,
Defendant.

Case No. CR-2005-0019431
MDTlON TO CONTWUE

1
1
)

Defendant hereby moves the Court for an Order continuing the hearing set for July /32006
by and for the reason that counsel for defendant is unavailable due to a felony jury trial set in
Shoshone County before Judge abler, entitled State v. Faith, Shoshone County Case No. 2006-

Dated this&day of July, 2006

Attorney for Defendant

MOTION TO CONTZNUE.Wge 1

P1

FROM :FRED LORTS OFFICE

FRX NO.

:

ul. 10 2006 10:39RM

CERT@ICATf? OF SERVICE

I hershy certify that a true copy ofthc foregoing was served upon counsel for the State by
FAX to the office of the Kootenai County F'rosecutingAttorney, at 446-1 833, t h i s u d a y of July,
2006.

#LUR 4.
I

FREDERICK G. UlATS
Attomoy for Defeddant

P2

FROM :FRED LORTS OFFICE

FRX NO. :

FREDERICK a. LOATS
Attorney at Law
2005 hnwood Parkway, Suite 210
P. 0.Box 83 1
Coeur dglene, ID 83816-01331
Telephone: (208)6G7-6424
F a : (208)664-3644
IS61 No. 2147
Attorney for Defendant

TN THE; DTSTRICT COURT OF THE FRST JUDICIAL DLSTRTCT OF TKF:
S'FATE OF IDAHO, LN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

1
1
)

VS.

Case No. CR-M05- 19431

ORDER TO CONTINWE

PEGGY JEAN EINNICUM,

Defendant.

)

Based up011tile Motion filed herein, and good cause appearing,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Sentel~cingHearing presently scheduled for the 13"
day of July, 2006 at
by the Clerk of tho Cou

DATED this

O

M TO CONTINUE- Page 1

FROM :FRED LORTS OFFICE

FRX NO.

:

d l . 10 2006 10:40RM P4

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 08 SERMCE

I hereby certify that on
foregoing was sent to:

2006, a true and correct copy of the

Frederick G. hats, Attorney at Law, by fax 664-3644
Kootcnai County Prosecuting Attorney, by fax L/#b -/f3

3

CLERK OF COURT

ORDER TO CONTINU&- Page 2

Case #

~ate7-;? l d & ~ i m e

&A&I

uu

,j

41

Courtroom #&

d

Judge
Tape # (Q 1 @
Court Reporter
T~pe
of ~roceedindb
Partv

p1/!9/7//
R~/I& J

I o ~ A ,2

Counsel

/
For
I
For
For
Identifier

I

,
Phase of Case

L# ~ f i / ~ ~ ~ i d
Defendant

Plaintiff
I(C-

1
L
I

Identifier

Phase of Case
I

DC 015 COURT MINUTES

FREDERZCK G. LOATS
Attorney at Law
2005 Ironwood Parkway-Suite 210
P. 0. Box 831
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
Telephone (208j667-6424
FOX:(208)664-3644
ISB No. 2347
Attorney for Defendant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)

1

Plaintiff,

Case No. CR-2005-001943 1

)

VS.

1
)

1
1

PEGGY JEAN FINNICUM,
Defendant.

CONDZTZONALPLEA OF
GUZLTY

)

Pursuant to the provisions of Rule 1 l(a)(2), I.C.R., defendant hereby enters a conditional
plea of guilty in the above entitled action, reserving the right to appeal from the judgment and the
denial of the Motion to Suppress. . "
Dated t h i s 2 3 day of

,2006.
FREDERICK G. LOATS
Attorney for Defendant

CONDITIONAL PLEA OF
GUILTY I

1

No Objection to entry of Conditional Plea:

4

L~

Depu Prosecutdng Attorney

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the -day of February, 2006, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing was sewed upon the Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney by fax to 446-1 833.

FREDERICK G. LOATS
Attorney for Defendant

CONDITIONAL PLEA OF
GLTLTY 2

FREDERICK G. LOATS
Attorney at Law
2005 Ironwood Parkway-Suite 210
P. 0. Box 831
Coeur dlcllene, ID 83814
Telephone (208jbd-i-6424
Far: (208)664-3644
ISB No. 2147

Attorney for Defendant
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF TfE

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

1

STATE OF IDAHO,

)

1

Plaintiff,

j
)
)

vs.

1

PEGGY JEAN FINNICUM,

Case No. CR-2005-001943 1
ORDER APPROYING AND
ACCEPTING CONDITIONAL
PLEA OF GUILTY

j

Defendant.

1

Pursuant to the provisions of Rule 1 l(a)(2), I.C.R., the Prosecuting Attorney having
consented to entry of a conditional plea, and good cause appearing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the conditional plea of guilty entered by the defendant in
the above entitled action, resewing the right to appeal from the judgment, to review the denial of
is accepted and approved.
2006.

ORDER ACCEPTING
CONDITIONAL PLEA OF GUILTY 1

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

%

I hereby certify that on t h a L day o
, 2006 a true and correct copy of the
foregoing was served upon the Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney by inter-office mailifax to
446-1833, and to Frederick G. Loats, attorney for defendant

ORDER ACCEPTING
COO\'31TIO\rW. PLEA Qf SLTILTY 2

JUDICIAL D m
324 W.GARDEN A"

CT COURT. STATEOFIDAHO. C O W OF KOOTENAI
I 0 Wl69000
I , P.O.BOX 9M)O,COEUR D'ALEME, .
'

a A T E OF IDAHO V
mGGY.JEuvmCUM
la363WRrmxvEwaD

POST

854

DL#

SSN

Doa

AC;ENCY: K O O r n A I COUNTY SHWIFlF

CASE # CR-a05-0019431

CITATION # 94468

The defendant avtng been fully advised of hislher statutory and constitutionai rights including the right to be represented by counsei, and
d e e n advised of right to court appointed counsel if indigent
Defendant waived right to counsel
• Judgment--Not Guilty
dant represented by counsel
• Judgment o n Trial--Guilty
Judgment for Defendant IInfraction
&men!,
Plea i f Guilty I Rights Waived
• Judgment for State 1 Infraction
Withheld Judgment
Accepted
qDismissed
• Bond Forfeited I Conviction Entered Case Closed
C] Bond Forfeited I Dismissed
A $2.00 handling fee
M O N I E S O I $ E D PAID:
Suspended $ 1-ba3. US)
~ n IePenalty $ 7 ddi7
OF7 Costs
mbation Fee $70.00
, or enroll in time payment program BEFO* due date.
O P a y by
Community Senrice
hours by
Setup Fee $
Insurance Fee $

-

.

.

k%%E:nerated,
provoed tha~any depori shall l~rstbe appl~edpursuant to Idaho Code 19.2923 m satofactan of oulslandrg fnes fees
ana costs wth any remainder lo be refunoed lo the postlnq parry
N o Contact order, as condition of bond, terminated.
days, Credit

-

days

0

easl;&:
Authorized (if you qualify)
qIn-Home Monitoring
6 f f ' s Community Labor Program in lieu of Jail (if you qualify) 90
hours by
DRIVING PRIVILEGESSUSPENDED 3~s"dayscommencing
REINSTATEMENTOF DRIVING PRIVILEGES MUST BE ACCOM

1 6 / 3 1 /'6

Must sign up within 7 days.

/fl
- "L o -f ~ / / 7

n drive. Apply to DRIVER'S~ERVICES,P.O. 00x7129,
Boise, ID. 83707-1129.

Temporary Driving Privileges Granted commencing
To, from and for work purposes1required medical care /court ordered alcohol program /community service. Must cany p r w f of w o k
schedule and liability insurance at all times. Not valid if insurance expires.
@S$ervsied
- See Addendum
PROBATION ORDERED FOR
YEAR(S) ON THE FOLLOWING CONDITIONS:
C] Violate no federal, state or local iaws more serious than an infraction.
CiComrnit no similar offenses.
Ci Maintain liability insurance on any vehicie that you drive.
Do not operate a motor vehicle with any alcohol in your bloodstream.
Ci You must submit to any blood alcohol concentration test requested of you, with reasonable cause, by a peace officer.
q Obtain a Substance AbuselBattery Evaluation, and file proof of evaluation, within
days.
q Enroll in
program, and file proof, within
days. File proof of completion within
days.
jXI Notify the court, in writing, of any address change within 10 days. Agrees to accept future service by mail at the last known address.
year(s). To be installed per attached addendum.
q interlock ignition device required on vehicle for
q Other

THEDEFENDANTHASTHERIGHTTO APPEAL
THISJUDGMENTWITHIN42 DAYS

.. "

...

FIRS

J D I C I A L D I S T R I C T , S T A T E C.
AH0
COUNTY O F KOOTENAI
SUPERVISED PROBATION ORDER
.,
. ,, r,.i.i,.:: @
. ~ ~;Q,;~f~,;;,,!
r ;!;j.(,S@
,.
.~,..
>:,)~!?;8
(Addendum)

-

i-11

?.

up.

"-L-_*.

STATE OF IDAHO V.

;$is

;~-J/-oG
----

-.--:

:...---.-

CASE #:
I T IS FURTHER ORDERED:

3

days are ordered, to be scheduled at a
~ n s c h e d u l e Jail
d Time (UJT), in the amount of
time and date requested by the Probation Office and approved by the Court.
DEFENDANT SHALL REPORT t o the Kootenai County Adult Misdemeanor Probation Office @ 106 E. Dalton Ave.
(PO Box 9000) Coeur dlAlene, Id. 83816-9000, (446-1985), WITHIN THREE (3) BUSINESS DAYS of today's date, in
reference t o this order. The following is also ordered:
THE DEFENDANTSHALL:

.
~

.

.

Fully cooperate, comply and be courteous with the Probation Office; be completely honest and forthright, and follow
any and all reasonable terms and conditions that the probation office may impose, including but not limited to:
-Pay probation supervision fees as allowed by statute and set by Probation Office, not to exceed $35.00 per month.
-Not evade supervision, and notify the probation office immediately of any change of address.
-Notify the Probation Office within 24 hours of any law enforcement contact.
-Maintain verifiable, sustained and gainful employment, or participate in a vocational/educational program aimed at
enhancing personallcommunity adjustment. A search for employment, if applicable, will be sought in full earnest.
-Submit readily t o searches of hislher person, personal effects, vehicle, residence andlor any accessible property
without a warrant, pursuant to probation supervision, at the request of the Probation Office or Law Enforcement.
-Abstain from using any alcohotic beverages.
-Not use or possess any illegal drug, not abuse any drug, and readily submit to testing for the presence of drugs or
alcohol, as requested by the Probation Office or Law Enforcement. Test samples shall not be altered in any way.
-Not be present i n an establishment where the primary business is the sale of alcohol (except for valid employment
purposes) andlor other places prohibited by the Probation Office.
-Not associate with other persons on probationlparoie or those who engage in unlawful activity.
-Not violate any federal, state or local laws, greater than a traffic infraction.
Additional/ the defendant shall complete a certified/approved:
&Alcohol
Evaluation; 0-DUI Evaluation; 0-Domestic Violence Evaluation; 0-Mental Health Evaluation;
0-Sexual Offender Evaluation; 0-Other Evaluation
and satisfactorily participate i n and complete the recommended and approved treatment in a manner and schedule
set by the Probation Office.
0 - N o t threaten, assault, intimidate, harass, or otherwise bother any victims or witnesses associated with this
matter and 0 - n o t initiate any contact directly or indirectly with any such party until further order of court or probation.

-

I, THE DEFENDANT, UNDERSTAND THAT ALL SUSPENDED PENALTIES (JAIUFINES), ARE SUBJECT TO COMPLIANCE WITH
ALL PROBATION TERMS, AND DO COMPLETELY ACCEPTTHE TERMS OFTHIS ORDER AND PROBATION.

Signed:
i

I

DATED

.,:-..:h,.+:.....

P,,,,.,,*,L,.7"3,,.

FROM :FRED LORTS OFFICE

FRX NO. :

2006 JUL 24 AN 10: 18

FREDERICK G LOATS
Altorni?y ut Law
2005 Ironwood Parkwuy-SU~~L-.
2113
P. 0. Box 831
Coeur d'.4[ene, ID 83814
Telephone (208)667-6424
bbr: (208)664-3644
ISB No. 2/47

Attorney for DdendantAppellant

IN 'I'ilE DlSTRICT COURT OF 'RlE FIRST JUDICIAL MS'YNCT OF THE
STATE OF rnhli0,TN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENA T
)

STAV, OF DAHO,

1

Plaintiff-Respoodcnt, )
I
)

VS.

)

Cwe No. CR-2005-0019431
MOK?UN FOR STAY OF EXECUTION
OF THESENTENCE PENDING APPEAL.

PEGGY JEAN r n C U M ,

1

-

Defendant-Appellant. )

,2

-

Pursuant to the provisions of Rule 54.5(b)(7), ICR, Defendant-Appellant hereby moves the
Court for an Order staying execution of the Judgment and Sentence imposed herein pending the
outcome of the appeal, and that such stay be ordered without the requirement that the Defendaut-

Appellant post bail, by and for the reason that the Defcnht-Appellant is a long term resident of
Kootenai County, rnanied, employed, has appeared for all Court proceedings and is no fligM risk.

Alternatively, the Defendant-Appellant requests that, pursuant to the provisions of Idaho
Code Section 19-3941, that the Court set bail in the amount of $1,000.00, which is the amount of
the fine and costs imposed in the Court's Judgment, which bail may he pstcrd in csh, and that rt
MOTTON FOR STAY OTEXECUTION
0,FSENTENCIsPENnING
APPEAL P a i y ~I

-

FRX NO. :

FROM :FRED LORTS OFFICE

stay of execution thereafter occur as mandatcd by ICR 5 4 . 3 4
Dated thisadaYof July, 2006.

Attorney for Defendant

I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing was served upon counsel for the State by
FAX to the offlee of?the Kootonai County Prosecuting Attorney, at 446- 1833, this
day of July,
2006.

a

Attorney for Defendant

MOTION FOR STAY OFEX3JCUTlON
OFSENTENCEPENnINGAPPE4L Poge 2

-

FRX NO. :

FROM :FRED LORTS OFFICE

.l.

24 2006 EP3:llfIM

P1

STATE OF IDAHO

CMIMIY OFKOC~TEMJ
}SS
FILED

FREDERICK 0,LOA TS
Attorney a1 Luw

200.5 Ironwood Parkway-Suite 2IO
P. 0. Box 831
Coew d'Alene, IL) 83814
Telephone (2013)667-($424
Fm: (208)664-3644
1SB Mo. 2147
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant

PITHE DlSlWCT COURT OF THE EILRST ,lUDTClAL DISTRICT OF l%l3
STATE OF IDMO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTm\lAI

STATE OF IDAHO,

)

1

Plaintiff-Respond&, )
vs.

1.
1
1

PECGY JEAN FINNlCLM,

)

Case No. CR-2005-0019431

NOTICE OF APPEAL

1

Defendant-Appellant. )

.."-"-

--..

.1

%Fendant hereby appeal from #at Judgment wtered in the above entitled action on the 2 1"
day of July, 2006, the Honorable Penny E. Friedlandcr, Magistrate Judge, presiding. Thr: appeal is
tsken upon both matters aflaw and fact. The testimony in the original hearing and proceedings
were recorded and are in tho posscssion of tho Clerk ofthe Court. The issue that will be asserted
on appeal is that the Ahgistr~teerred in denying the Motion to Suppress
Dated thisaday of July, 2006.
FREDERICK G. LOATS
Attorney for Defendant

FROM :FRED LOOTS OFFICE

FRX NO.

:

J hereby certifjr that a true copy ofthe foregoing was sewed upon counset tbr the State by
FAX to the office of the Kootenai County Prosecuting Attomey, at 446- 1833, thisay day of July,
2006.

M.-L.
kf
FREDERICK G. IXIA'm
Attorney for &fendant

N0.TfCE0FAI'PE.M

- Page 2

FQX NO.

FRO@ :FRED LOATS OFFICE

:

FREDERICK G. LOA ATS
Attorney ai Luw
2005 frc~rnondParkway-Suite 210
P. 0. Brm 83 I
Coe14ri i ' ~ ~ ~ n e ,83814
Telephone (208)667-6424

F a : (20R/664-3644
I S 8 No. 2147
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant

IN THE IXSTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JXJD1CIA.l. DlSTRlCT OF THE
STATE OF IT)AHO,

AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

)
)

STATE OF TDAFJ.0,

Plaintiff-Respondent, )

1
1

VS.

)

PEGGY JEAN FINNICUM,

Case No, CR-2005-0019431
ORDER STAYIN( EXECUTTON
OF TI&!?S&"T%NCE PENDING APPEAL

1

1

Defendant-Appellant. )

-...-

--

Based upon the Appeal and Motion for Stay filed herein by the Defendant-Appellant,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED thax execution ofthe Judgment and Sentence imposed herein
shalt be stayed pending the outcome ofthe appeal.

ORDER ST4 W G EWCt/TfON
OF SENl!ENCIEPENnING APPEAL -Page 1

FROM :FRED LORTS OFFICE

FRX NO. :

CFBmCATE OF SERVICE

T hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing was sewed upon counsel forthe State by
FAX to the office of the Kootenai County Prosecuting Anorncy, at 446-1833,
Defendant-Appellant by FAX to Frederick G. Loats*at 6 w 4 4 , thisAk

ORDER STA YlNG EXECUTION

OF.~NTZ3CEPliNDXNGAPPEAl.-Page 2

O i l :FRFD LOFTS OFF1CE

FREDERICK G LOA TS
Attorney at Luw
1 I 1 North 2nd Street
P. 0. Box 83 1
Coeur d512ene, ID 83814
?'ekephone (208)667-6424
Fax: (208)664-3644
ISA No. 2 147

2806 SEP 25

RH 10: 57

,--',

Attorney for Uefendant-Appellant
IN TI% DISTRICT COTJRT OF T.kE FIRST .TUDICTAL DISTRICT OF TEE

STATE OF IDAHO,IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTEN'N

1

STATE OF IDAHO,

)

Plaintiff-Respondent, )
)
)

VS.

PEGGY .WAN FR\TNICUM,

Case No. CR-2005-0019431
BRIEF OF APPELLANT

1
1
)

Defendant-Appellmt. )

.-

."

-d
Statement of the Case

This is an appeal taben a k r sentry of a conditional plea of guilty to the charge of driving
while under the influenceofalcohol, after denial of the Defendant- appellant"^ Motion to Suppress.
After being charged with driving while under the influence, the Appellant filed ahlotjon (:o
Suppress, contending that certain material evidence was ucquired by the police in violation cuf her
constitutional right to be $?ee from unreasonable searches and seizures. Specificallythe Appellant
contended that the police had unlawfully entered her home to seize her during the course oftheir
investigation.
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An evidontiary hearing was held on the Motion to Suppress on December 15,2005. The
Court took the matter under advisement, nnd later enter& its decision denying the Motion to
Suppress. The Appellant then filed aMotion for reconsideration, which was denied a k r argument.

J&suesPresented on Api~eaf
I. Did the Court err in ruling that the police may InwFully invade a home to effect a Teny
style detention?

2. Did the Court e n in finding and then ruling that tho police had prohable cause to arrest
the Appellant for driving while under the influence of alcohol, and then could constitutiondly enter
her home to arrest her under the exigent circumstances exception io the warrant requirement?
Statement of the Baets

At the Suppression Hearing, the parties stipulated that the matter be submitted on the facts

set forth in the arresting offroer's report, admitted as Plaintiffs Exhibit #I. Tr, p. 3, L 15-24.
The pertinent part of the report states US 'Follows:
"On 09/25/05 at approx. 1756 hours I along with (M) Dep. Vrevich were dispatched to
respond to a possible do&esljc dispute at 18363 W. Riverview Dr. While enroute to the call
Dispatch notifled us that the female halfhad left the scene driving a white Chevy Blwer and was
possibly intoxicated. Dep. Vrevich was checkingthc.area and also advised Post Falls of a possible
intoxicated driver. I am'ved on scene at approx. 1810 hours were (sic) 1met Arthur M. Finnicum.
Archur and his girlfriend were waiting at the top of his driveway on Riverview Rd. To speak with
me reference the possible domestic dispute.
Arthur said that he and his mother, (S)Peggy J. Finnicum got into a verbal argument carlier
that evening because Arthur believed &at she needed to stop drinking. Athur said Peggy got upset
and said 'Fuck you!" repeatedly. Arthur said he did not know what to do so he called his father for
advice. Arthur said his father told him to call the police. Arthur said when he called the police
Peggy 1eA the house driving hcr white Chevy Blazer. Arthur said that Peggy had been drinking
alcoholic beverages all day and he believed that she was highly intoxicated.
While I was speaking to Arthur at approx. 182 1 hours, I saw Peggy drive up in her white
Chevy Blazer tmve1in.geastbound on Riverview Dr. 1flagged Peggy down and told her to pull into
the driveway so I could speak to her. While I was speaking to her I could smell the strong odor of
an alcob,oiicbeverage on her breath. :I advised her to drive down the driveway in a safe area so I
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could do some further investigation. Peggy was slurring her speech, had glassy and blood shot eyes,
and seemed confused.
1 asked Peggy to step out of the vehicle. Peggy stepped out of the vehicle. I told Peggy to
stay by her car so J could speak to Arthur. Peggy continued t said, 'What are you doing here' 1
advised Peggy that 1was here to investigate a domesticdisturbance between her and hcr son Arthur.
1 trtso advised Peggy that she appeared to be intoxicated and she was driving her vehicle on a public
roadway.
Wh11e I was speaking to Afihur, peg^ went Jnto the house. Dep Vrevich arrived on scenc
to assist me m my investigation. 1 advised Dep. Vrevich thct Pagby went into the house when she
was told lo stay outside. Dep Vrevich and I enlered the house through the .frontdoor to reestablish
contact with Peggy."
Deputy Vrevich supplemented the report with his &stimony. He said that when he arrived
Peggy Finnicum was outside her house, sitting on a bench. He was talking with the other Deputy
when Peggy Finnicum got up and walked inside her home. He foliowe& without pemission or
consent. Tr., pp. 7-8. J3e testified he did so because he was concerned she may have access to
weapons inside the home. Tr., p. 8, L 18-19.
Peggy was "upset" that the Deputy entored her home. Tr., p. 9, L 2-3. I-fe rclnained inside
the home with her, and then he and the other Deputy took her outside, where she was asked and
performed fidd sobriety evaluations. After these evaluationswere completed, she was wrested for
driving while under the ifiuence. Pursuant to Idaho's Implied Consent Law, she submitted to
evidentitrry tosting which showed an alcohol concentration in excess of .20, and she was therefore

charged with '%xcessive"DUI
Argument
A. The officer's entty into the Appellant's home to complete or continue their Terry

(Mention was unconstitntictnal:

In State v. Manthei, 230 Idaho 237,240 (1 997). the Cow held that once a Terry style stop

is initiated, The police may lawfully enter a subject" home to takc the individual into physical
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custody, See, also, State v. Hinson, 132 Idaho 110 (1.998).
In State v. Maland, 140 Idaho 817 (2004)- the Court ovemled State v. Manthei and State
v. Hinson. "This Court holds that th.epolice naynot make a warrantless, nc>nconsensualentry into

a residence in order ~o effectuate a 1 P r y stop...." State V. Maland, 140 Idaho 8 17,818 (2004).
"Manthei waq wrongly decided and must be overruled. Manthei has led to the cnoneous

argument that taw enforcement officers may enter u home to effectuate a 'hny stop when there is
no probable cause for an arxest, nor exigent circumstances including but not limited to, officer OT
other's safety. [Citations omitted]. For the same reasons, State v. Rinson, 132 Idaho 110,967P.2d
724 (1,998) was also wrongly decided and must be overruled." Statev. Maland, 140Idaho 817,823
(2004).
The Court distinguished Malaad by ruling that the stop in Matand ~

a not
c initiated outside

the residence, but only after entry into the residence. However, this overlooks the precise language
quoted above, in which the Court overmfcd Manthei and Hinson. This element of the Maland
decision has been addressed by the Court of Appcals.

"In Maethei, the Court had held that an officer may follow a person into his home where
the officer la~fbllyinitiates an investigative Teny stop bwed upon reasonable suspicion and that

person retreats into his home. [Citation oomitted]. Wanthei lias led to the erroneous argument that
law enfmcemenl officers may enter a home to effectuate a Terry stop when there is no probable

cause for an arrest, nor exigent circumstances including but not limited to officer or other's safety.'
[Citation omitteq. 'l'hus, despite the fact that the Court in Maland found the officer's failure to
show authority prior to h4aiand's attempt to cl.oscthe door to be significant, the Court overruled
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Manthei and coi~cludedthat initiation of a Tern1 stop in a public place does not allow the oficer
to follow if the individual pursued retreats into his home." State v. Jenkins, I d a h o

-- (Ct.

App., March 1.0,2006),2006 op. no. 17.
The Maland and Jenkins decisions are binding precedent and establish that the entry that

occurred in this case was uncon,stitutinnal, under a Terry stopjustification. In addition, no exigent
circumstances were present that justified entry into the home. D g . Vrevich gave his reasons for
entry as a concern for weapons. The call the police responded to was a verbal argument between
mother and son. There was no indication of my acts ofviolence or weapons present. The fact that
the police labeled thc call under the rubtic of "domestic disturbance" does not automatically give
them carte blanohe to ignore the constitutinn and invade the sanctity ofthe home.

B. There was no arrest prior to entry into the borne:
' h e Appellantwas not arrested before she entered her home. She was not told she was under
arrest, nor was she subjected to thnt type ofphysical restraint n.onnally associated with an arrest.
Neither of the officers entered hcr home to place her under arrest. In fact, after they removed her
From her home they had her do field sobriety evaluatiom, questioned her, and conducted a '%)UPy
investigxtion. It was only after this investigation was comp'lete that they concluded probb1e cause
existed to place her under arrest. To find, after the fact, that the police had probable cause to arrest
her for DkJl prior to entry into her home, and therefore exigent circumstances existed to justiQ the
warrantless entry into her home, i s to .re-find thc fwts to fit a result and do a disservice to the
constitutional protections provided to an individual's home. The distinction between "probable
cause to asrest" and "reauonable articulable suspicion that criminal activity has occurred or is
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occumhg$:"[the Trrry standard], i s impossible to define with precision. See, Ornclar V. United
States, 5 17 U.S.690 (1996).It is therefore better practice to apply the appropriate legal standards
basedupon the reality of police action. The police did notarrestPeggyPinnicum before she entered
her home. They did not tell her she was under arrest when they entered her home. They did not tell
her she w a s under arrest when they removed her from her home and had her pirform field sobri&y
evaluations. If they had done so, then thcy should have also advised her of her constjtutional rights
under Mtranda v. Arizona.
Since the police did not arrest her prior to their entry, thcre is no need to annlyze the case
from tlmt perspective. The Mland decision is therefore controlling, and the Mbtion to Suppress
should have been. granranted.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully requestedthatthe .ludgment be set aside and the
case remanded with instructions to grant the Appellant's Motion to Suppress.
/

Dated this%$
-day of September, 2006.

Attorney for Defendant

1hereby certify that a hue copy of thc foregoing was served upon counsel for the State by
FAX to the office of the Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney, at 446-1833, this23 day of

September, 2006.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Slightly before 6:00 p.m. on September 25,2005, Kootenai County Deputies Vrevich and
McFarland were dispatched to a possible domestic dispute at a residential address. Transcript,
Motion to Suppress and Oral Decision, at 27. While on route, Dispatch advised that the "female
half' of the dispute had left the scene in a white Chevy Blazer and was possibly intoxicated. Tr.
at 28. As the first to arrive on scene, Deputy McFarland made contact with the reporting party,
the Defendant's son, Arthur Finnicum. Tr. at 28. Mr. Finnicum informed Deputy McFarland
that he and his mother had gotten into a verbal argument over her drinking and that she had
driven away in her white Chevy Blazer when he had called the police. Tr. at 28. According to

Mr. Finnicum, his mother had been drinking alcoholic beverages all day, and he believed her to
be higbly intoxicated. Tr. at 28.

While speaking to Mr. Finnicum, Deputy McFarland saw the Defendant driving the white
Chevy Blazer back to the residence. Tr. at 28. He flagged the Defendant down and told her to
pull into the driveway so he could speak with her. Tr. at 28-29. Defendant complied. While
speaking with her, Deputy McFarland observed the strong odor of an alcoholic beverage on her
breath, glassy and bloodshot eyes, slurred speech, and that she seemed confused. Tr. at 29. He
then had the Defendant drive down the driveway to a safe place in order to do some further
investigation. At that location, Deputy McFarland asked Defendant to step out of the vehicle,
which she did. Tr. at 29. He also told her to stay by the car so he could speak fiuther with her
son. Tr. at 29. He informed Defendant that he was there to investigate a domestic dispute
between her and her son and that she appeared to be driving her vehicle on a public roadway
while intoxicated. Tr. at 29.
Deputy Vrevich arrived as a cover unit while Deputy McFarland was speaking with Mr.
Finnicum for the second time. Tr. at 28. While Deputy Vrevich spoke with Deputy McFarland,
he noticed the Defendant walking into the house. Tr. at 29. She appeared to him to either be
intoxicated, or have a physical impairment, because she was not walking in a straight line. Tr.
29-30. AAer Deputy McFarland told Deputy Vrevich both that the Defendant had driven right by
him on a public road and exhibited a blank stare, as if she did not see him, and that he had
previously told the Defendant to stay outside, Deputy Vrevich followed the Defendant into the
house to reestablish contact with her. Tr. at 29-30. He was specifically concerned about the
possibility of weapons, due to the call being reported as a "domestic", and he wanted to keep an
eye on the Defendant. Tr. at 30.
Once inside the house, Deputy Vrevich observed that Defendant had glossy eyes, an odor
of alcohol, slurred speech, and trouble speaking. Tr. at 30. Deputy McFarland asked Defendant
to complete field sobriety tests in her driveway, and she was ultimately arrested. Tr. at 30. Afler

submitting a breath sample with a breath alcohol content of .26/.25, Defendant was charged with
Excessive Driving Under the Influence. Tr. 30.
Defendant moved to suppress evidence on the grounds that police entry into her home
was unlawful. Tr. at 1. The trial court denied Defendant's motion on the grounds that a
stop had been effectuated outside of the residence when Defendant complied with police orders
to pull forward in the driveway and step out of the vehicle. Tr. at 32. Thus, the police entry into
Defendant's residence was not unlawful, according to State v. Maland, 140 Idaho 817, 103 P.3d
430 (2004), and prior authority. Tr. at 33. Defendant now appeals the trial court's ruling.
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Whether or Not Police Lawfully Pursued the Defendant into Her Residence After She Had
Been Lawfully Ordered to Remain Outside the Home.
STANDARD O F REVIEW
"Upon an appeal from the magistrate's division of the district court, not involving a trial
de novo, the district court shall review the case on the record and determine the appeal as an
appellate court in the same manner and upon the same standards of review as an appeal from the
district court to the Supreme Court under the statutes and law of this state, and the appellate rules
of the Supreme Court." I.R.C.P. 83(u)(l). When reviewing a trial court's order denying or
granting a motion to suppress, the appellate court is to accept the trial court's factual findings,
unless they are clearly erroneous. State v. Fees, 140 Idaho 81, 84,90 P.3d 306,309 (2004). The
appellate court exercises free review, however, over the question of whether or not those facts
require suppression of the evidence.

Id. The appellate court is fiee also to affirm the trial court's

decision on a legal basis other than that relied upon by the trial court. S e e s . State v. Murray,
Ct. App., decided November 30,2006, WL 3438037 * l .

ARGUMENT
The Magistrate Court's Denial of Defendant's Motion to Suppress Should be Affirmed
Because, at the Time of Entry into Defendant's Residence, the Officers Were Faced With
Exigent Circumstances and had Probable Cause to Arrest Defendant and/or Search Her
House.
A.

The Potential Destruction of Evidence Presented by Defendant's Flight into
the Residence Qualifies as Exigent Circumstances, Because Driving Under
the Influence is Not a "Relatively Minor" Crime and the Evidence at Issue Is
Evanescent in Nature.

Police officers may enter a home without a warrant if probable cause and exigent
circumstances are present. State v. Curl, 125 Idaho 224, 225, 869 P.2d 224, 225 (1993) (citing
Pavton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1983)). Exigencies which justify a warrantless entry of a
home include potential destruction of evidence, so long as the offense related to the evidence is
not "relatively minor." Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S.740 (1984); State v. Fees, 140 Idaho 81,
88,90 P.3d 306, 313 (2004); State v. Curl, 125 Idaho at 226, 869 P.2d at 226. Whether or not an
offense is "relatively minor" depends on the nature of the penalty for the offense.

Fees, 140

Idaho at 88,90 P.3d at 313 (overruling in part State v. Curl, where Curl held that the analysis
depended on whether the offense involved was violent or nonviolent.) See also Illinois v.
McArthur, 531 U.S. 326 (2001). This is because, "[gliven that the classification of state crimes
differs widely among the States, the penalty that may attach to any particular offense seems to
provide the clearest and most consistent indication of the State's interest in arresting individuals
suspected of committing that offense."
at 336 (quoting

Fees, 140 Idaho at 88,90 P.3d at 313 (quoting McArthur,

m,at 754)).

1.

Driving Under the Influence is Not a "Relatively Minor" Offense.

No Idaho case law has addressed the question of whether or not driving under the
influence is a "relatively minor" offense for purposes of applying the exigent circumstances
doctrine. However, under Idaho's statutory scheme, first offense driving under the influence is

categorized as a misdemeanor criminal offense, punishable by up to six months of jail and a
$1,000 fine, or both. I.C.

5 18-8005(a) and (b) (2006). In addition, an individual convicted of

driving under the influence, even for the first time, could suffer an absolute driver's license
suspension for a period of up to six months. I.C.

5 18-8005(d) (2006). These penalties increase

with subsequent convictions, with a third conviction in ten years constituting a felony. See LC. 5
18-8005(5) (2006). Consequently, an individual convicted of driving under the influence faces
significant curtails of his or her freedom that one does not face if convicted of an infraction or
other misdemeanor. By authorizing such a penalty scheme for driving under the influence, the
Idaho State Legislature has established that driving under the influence is not a "relatively
minor" offense.
Such conclusion is supported by a thorough examination of Welsh v. Wisconsin. In
w h , a witness observed a car that was being driven erratically, eventually swerving off the
road and coming to a stop in a field without causing damage to any person or property. &!&&, at
742. The driver walked away from the scene despite advice from the witness that he wait for
assistance in removing the car.

Id. When police arrived a few minutes later, they were told by

a. After tracing the car's
registration back to the defendant's address, the police entered the home.' a. They found the

the witness that the driver was either very inebriated or very sick.

defendant lying naked in bed, and he was subsequently arrested for driving while under the
influence of an intoxicant. m h , at 743.
The defendant challenged his arrest as the result of an unlawful, warrantless entry into his
home. m h , at 747. Inter alia, the State argued that need to preserve evidence of the
defendant's blood-alcohol level constituted an exigent circumstance which, when coupled with
'The police entered after the defendant's stepdaughter answered the door. However, because the
trial court did not make a finding as to whether the entry was consensual, the Court assumed that
there was no valid consent to enter the defendant's home for purposes of its decision. See

probable cause for the defendant's arrest, allowed the warrantless entry. @. at 753. Such
argument was rejected by the Court, because the State of Wisconsin had chosen to classify a first
offense of driving while intoxicated as a "noncriminal, civil forfeiture offense," for which no
imprisonment was authorized.

Id.at 746 (citing Wis.Stat. 4 346.65(2) (1975)). Thus, it was

significant that the maximum penalty authorized for such an offense was a mere $200 fine and no
jail. See Id.
is clearly distinguishable Erom the present case, and other state courts have
similarly limited Welsh's application to nonjailable offenses. For example, in People v.
Thompson, 135 P.3d 3, 38 Cal.4"' 81 1 (2006), the California Supreme Court addressed the very
issue before this Court and held that exigent circumstances justified a warrantless entry to effect
a driving under the influence arrest, because California classifies driving under the influence as a
criminal act punishable by no more than six months and no less than 96 hours in jail. Thompson,
135 P.3d at 9, 38 Cal.4' at 821. In fact, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Iowa,
Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Texas, Utah, Virginia,
Washington, West Virginia, Wyoming, and the First Circuit Court of Appeals (applying
Massachusetts law) have all distinguished Welsh on similar grounds.
at 10-1 1,38 ~aI.4' at 822-23. Even Wisconsin has since distinguished

Thom~son,135 P.3d

m,where the

distinguishing court was faced with a misdemeanor offense punishable by up to six months in
jail, rather than the nonjailable offense present in Welsh. Id., 135 P.3d at 10, 38 Cal.4"' at 823
(citing State v. Hughes, 607 N.W.2d 621, 233 Wis.2d 280 (2000)).
Here, the Idaho State Legislature has clearly indicated that it considers driving under the
influence a more serious crime than did the Wisconsin State Legislature at the time Y&l& was
decided. It has done so not only by authorizing serious penalties for those who drive while under

the influence, which penalties entitle a defendant to a jury trial and court-appointed attorney if
defendant is indigent, but also by treating driving under the influence as a felony for the purpose
of arrest. See I.C. § 49-1405 (2006); State v. Ruhter, 107 Idaho 282,283,688 P.2d 1187, 1188
(1984). The Legislature has further indicated it considers driving under the influence a serious
crime by enacting law requiring individuals reasonably suspected of driving under the influence
to submit to evidentiary testing of their breath or blood upon request of a police officer. See I.C.
§ 18-8002(1) (2006). It is therefore appropriate that driving under the influence be deemed by

Idaho courts as not a "relatively minor" offense for purposes of applying exigent circumstances
doctrine.
2.

The Potential Destruction of Evanescent Evidence Clearly Qualifies as
Exigent Circumstances.

Idaho has already recognized that the potential loss or destruction of evanescent evidence
such as the concentration of alcohol in one's blood or breath qualifies as exigent circumstances.
See State v. Cooper, 136 Idaho 697,701,39 P.3d 637,641 (Ct. App. 2001). This is due to the
fact that "blood alcohol concentration begins to dissipate due to the body's natural metabolism of
alcohol shortly after a person stops drinking." Id. Consequently, police officers in Idaho are
empowered to order medical personnel to withdraw a blood sample for evidentiary testing.

LC.

5

18-8002(6)(b) (2006); See also Cooper, at 696,39 P.3d at 636. Moreover, all drivers in

Idaho are deemed to have consented to an evidentiary breath or blood test if one is reasonably
requested by a police officer. I.C.

5 18-8002(1) (2006).

When Deputy Vrevich followed Defendant into her residence, Defendant was suspected
to have been driving while under the influence of alcohol. There can be no question that the
physical effects of any alcohol Defendant consumed were diminishing as time lapsed, as was the
concentration of any alcohol contained in Defendant's blood. Had Deputy Vrevich remained
outside Defendant's house until a warrant could be secured, valuable evidence would have been

lost. The longer Defendant remained in her home, unattended by an officer, the more evidence
was lost by the mere passage of time. Furthermore, left unattended, Defendant would have been
able to actively destroy evidence by consuming additional amounts of alcohol, thereby
destroying any evidence of the actual alcohol concentration in her body at the time she was
suspected of driving while under the influence. Accordingly, the police had every reason to fear
the loss of evidence if they failed to act, and exigent circumstances required they act precisely as
they did.
B.

The Potential of Weapons Being Retrieved from Within the Residence
Qualifies as Exigent Circumstances.

In addition to the exigent circumstances presented by the potential destruction of
evidence, Deputies Vrevich and McFarland were faced with the additional exigency presented by
a possibility of a weapon being retrieved fiom Defendant's Residence. Exigencies which justify
a warrantless entry of a home include "the risk of danger to the police or to other persons inside
or outside the dwelling." State v. Pearson-Anderson, 136 Idaho 847,850,41 P.3d 275,278,
(quoting Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 100 (1990). The standard is objective, and the test is
whether the facts and inferences known to the police at the time of entry would "warrant a man
of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate." a.(quoting State v.
Monroe, 101 Idaho 251,254, 61 1 P.2d 1036, 1039 (1980) (citation omitted)). See also State v.

m,138 Idaho 290,293 (Ct. App. 2003).
In the present case, Deputies Vrevich and McFarland responded to a report of a domestic
disturbance. The Defendant's son was the reporting party, who informed the officers upon their
anival that his mother had left, intoxicated and upset. At the time Defendant went into her
house, the entire course of events that prompted Defendant's son to call the police had not been
sorted out. They officers had not yet had the time to fully investigate whether or not Defendant
presented an individual danger to her son, herself, or the officers. In particular, they had no way
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to know what access Defendant may have had to weapons inside her home. By going into the
residence, the Defendant demonstrated her unwillingness to comply with a lawful police order to
remain outside. It was thus necessary, out of concern for the safety of everyone present, for
Deputy Vrevich to follow Defendant into her home.
C.

The Police Had Both Probable Cause to Believe that Evidence of a Crime
Would be Found Inside Defendant's House and Probable Cause to Arrest
Defendant.

Probable cause to search exists when, "given all the circumstances, . . . there is a fair
probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place."

m,138 Idaho 18,23,56 P.3d 780,785 (Ct. App. 2002) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S
213,238 (1983)). Probable cause to arrest has been defined as information that "would lead a
man of ordinary care and prudence to believe or entertain an honest and strong suspicion that
such person is guilty." State v. Weber, 116 Idaho 449,776 P.2d 458,461 (1989). Said another
way:
The requirement of probable cause does not mean that arresting officers must have
sufficient evidence to secure a conviction. Rather, the test is whether "the facts and
circumstances within the officers" knowledge and of which they had reasonably
trustworthy information were sufficient to w6ant aprudent man &believingthat thk
suspect had committed or was committing an offense.
State v. Hollon, 136 Idaho 499, 36 P.3d 1287, 1290, (Ct. App. 2001) (quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379
U.S. 89, 91, 85 S.Ct. 223,225 (1964)) (internal alterations and quotations omitted).
At the time Deputy Vrevich entered Defendant's house, he had probable cause to believe
he would find evidence of a crime inside - namely, the Defendant, with the alcohol content of
her breath and blood, as well as her physical displays of being under the influence of an
intoxicant. Prior to entry, Deputy Vrevich had personally observed Defendant have difficulty
walking into the house, appearing to be either intoxicated or have a physical impairment. He had
also been informed that Defendant had driven by Deputy McFarland, on a public road, with what

appeared to be a blank stare. Furthermore, he had been informed by Dispatch that Defendant's
son had reported his mother as driving while intoxicated. Even without the additional facts
known to Deputy McFarland, ie.,Defendant's slurred speech, glossy and bloodshot eyes, and
odor of alcoholic beverage, Deputy Vrevich had sufficient information to reasonably believe
I

I

Defendant was concealing evidence of the crime of driving under the influence inside her house,
simply by the fact of her presence there.
The deputies also had probable cause to arrest Defendant for a crime at the time Deputy
Vrevich entered Defendant's house. Based on the facts listed in the preceding paragraph, a man
of ordinary care and prudence would entertain an honest and strong suspicion that Defendant was
guilty of driving under the influence of alcohol.
Therefore, the probable cause prong of exigent circumstances analysis is satisfied in this
case, whether the exigent circumstances were those presented by the potential destruction of
evidence, or those presented by the concern that Defendant would retrieve a weapon from within
the house.

CONCLUSION
At the heart of exigent circumstances analysis is the recognition that there are times when
the "facts known to the police at the time of the entry, along with reasonable inferences drawn
thereupon, demonstrate a 'compelling need for official action and no time to secure a warrant."'
See State v. Barrett, 138 Idaho 290,293 (Ct. App. 2003). Clearfy, the officers in this case were
faced with just such circumstances. They had probable cause to believe Defendant had
committed a serious crime - driving under the influence, probable cause to believe evidence of
that crime would be found in Defendant's residence once she entered it, and legitimate concerns
regarding safety and the potential destruction of evidence. Had the officers waited to obtain a
warrant, people could have been harmed, and valuable evidence would have been lost. The

Magistrate Court was correct to deny Defendant's Motion to Suppress, and this Court should
affirm the Magistrate Court's decision.
DATED this

&day of

,&!?c

.

,2006.

WILLIAM J. DOUGLAS
Kootenai County Prosecutor
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People v. ThompsonCal.,2006.
Supreme Court of California
The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
Daniel Lyon THOMPSON, Defendant and
Appellant.
No. S130174.

warrantless entry into defendant's residence
to effect arrest; disapproving People v.
Schojeld, 90 Cal.App.4th 968, 109
Cal.Rptr.2d 429.

Judgment of the Court of Appeal reversed.

June 1,2006.
Werdegar, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
Background: Defendant pleaded guilty in
the Superior Court, Santa Barbara County,
No. 1106282,Frank J. Ochoa, J., to driving
with a blood alcohol content of 0.08 or
higher and resisting arrest, after the trial
court denied his suppression motion.
appeaIed,
the
Appellate
Defendant
Division of the Superior Court affirmed,
and the Court of Appeal ordered transfer.
The Court of Appeal reversed, and the
Supreme
Court
granted
review,
superseding the opinion of the Court of
Appeal.
aoldings: The Supreme Court, Baxter, J.,
held that:

(1) oscers had probable cause to arrest
defendant for driving under the influence
(DUI), and
(2)

exigent

circumstances

Opinion, 21 Cal.Rptr.3d 221, superseded.
West Headnotes
[I] Arrest 35 -63.4(1)
35 Arrest
3511 On Criminal Charges
35k63 Officers and Assistants,
Arrest Without Warrant
35k63.4 Probable or Reasonable
Cause
35k63.4(1) k. Grounds for
Warrantless Arrest in General. Most Cited
Cases
In conformity with the rule at common
law, a warrantless arrest by a law officer is
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment
where there is probable cause to believe
that a criminal offense has been or is being
committed. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.

justified
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[2] Searches and Seizures 349 -25.1

Warrant

349 Searches and Seizures
3491 In General
349k25 Persons, Places and Things
Protected
349k25.1 k. In General. Most
Cited Cases
Under the Fourth Amendment, searches
and seizures inside a home without a
warrant are presumptively unreasonable.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.

349k45 k. Likely Escape or Loss
of Evidence. Most Cited Cases
The presumption of unreasonableness that
attaches to a warrantless entry into the
home can be overcome by a showing of
one of the few specifically established and
well-delineated exceptions to the warrant
requirement, such as hot pursuit of a
fleeing felon, imminent destruction of
evidence, the need to prevent a suspect's
escape, or the risk of danger to the police
or to other persons inside or outside the
dwelling. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.

[3] Searches and Seizures 349 -42.1
349 Searches and Seizures
3491 In General
349k42 Emergencies and Exigent
Circumstances; Opportunity to Obtain
Warrant
349k42.1 k. In General. Most
Cited Cases
Searches and Seizures 349 -43
349 Searches and Seizures
3491 In General
349k42 Emergencies and Exigent
Circumstances; Opportunity to Obtain
Warrant
349k43 k. Pursuit. Most Cited
Cases
Searches and Seizures 349 -45
349 Searches and Seizures
3491 In General
349k42 Emergencies and Exigent
Circumstances; Opportunity to Obtain

[4] Automobiles 48A -349(6)
48A Automobiles
48AVII Offenses
48AVII(B) Prosecution
48Ak349 Arrest, Stop, or Inquiry;
Bail or Deposit
48Ak349(2) Grounds
48Ak349(6)
k.
Intoxication. Most Cited Cases
Officers had probable cause to arrest
defendant for driving under the influence
(DUI); reporting citizen-witness saw
defendant have difficulty walking, toss
empty vodka bottle out of his vehicle, pass
out in vehicle, and subsequently drive
erratically, and vehicle registration,
iocation of vehicle in front of defendant's
residence, witness's description of driver
and identification of location, and
defendant's speech and posture provided
justification for suspicion that defendant
was
driver of
vehicle.
U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 4.
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151 Arrest 35 *63.4(2)
35 Arrest
3511 On Criminal Charges
35k63 Officers and Assistants,
Arrest Without Warrant
35k63.4 Probable or Reasonable
Cause
35k63.4(2)
k.
What
Constitutes Such Cause in General. Most
Cited Cases
"Probable cause" to arrest exists when the
facts known to the arresting officer would
persuade someone of reasonable caution
that the person to be arrested has
crime.
U.S.C.A.
committed
a
Const.Amend. 4.

(61 Arrest 35 -63.4(2)
35 Arrest
3511 On Criminal Charges
35k63 Officers and Assistants,
Arrest Without Warrant
35k63.4 Probable or Reasonable
Cause
k.
What
35k63.4(2)
Constitutes Such Cause in General. Most
Cited Cases
Probable cause to arrest is incapable of
precise definition, and it is a fluid
concept-turning on the assessment of
probabilities in particular factual contexts.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.
[7] Arrest 35 -63.4(2)

35 Arrest
3511 On Criminal Charges

35k63 Officers and Assistants,
Arrest Without Warrant
35k63.4 Probable or Reasonable
Cause
35k63.4(2)
k.
What
Constitutes Such Cause in General. Most
Cited Cases
Probable cause for arrest involves a
reasonable ground for belief of guilt, and
that belief must be particularized with
respect to the person to be seized.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.

[8] Searches and Seizures 349 -23
349 Searches and Seizures
3491 In General
349k23 k. Fourth Amendment and
Reasonableness in General. Most Cited
Cases
Sufficient probability of criminal conduct,
not certainty, is the touchstone of
the
Fourth
reasonableness
under
Amendment. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.

[9] Searches and Seizures 349 5 3 4 5
349 Searches and Seizures
3491 In General
349k42 Emergencies and Exigent
Circumstances; Opportunity to Obtain
Warrant
349k45 k. Likely Escape or Loss
of Evidence. Most Cited Cases
The imminent destruction of evidence is an
exigent
circumstance
justifying
a
warrantless entry into a residence to effect
an arrest. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.
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[lo] Automobiles 48A -349(12)
48A Automobiles
48AVII Offenses
48AVII(B) Prosecution
48Ak349 Arrest, Stop, or Inquiry;
Bail or Deposit
48Ak349(12) k. Place and
Time. Most Cited Cases
Given serious nature of, and potential
incarceration for, offense of driving under
the influence (DUI), exigent circumstances
of dissipation of alcohol in defendant's
blood, thereby destroying evidence, and
possibility of defendant's ingesting more
alcohol to mask blood-alcohol content
while driving, justified 'warrantless entry
into residence to effect arrest of defendant
for whom police had probable cause to
believe had committed DUI very recently;
disapproving People v. Scho$eld, 90
Cal.App.4th 968, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 429.
Const.Amend.
4;
West's
U.S.C.A.
Ann.Ca1.Vehicle Code $3 23536,40300.5.
See 4 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law
(3d ed. 2000) Pretrial Proceedings, $$ 25
et seq., 45; Cal. Jur. 3d, Criminal Law:
Pretrial Proceedings, $ 210 et seq.
1111 Automobiles 48A -418
48A Automobiles
48AIX Evidence of Sobriety Tests
48Ak417 Grounds for Test
48Ak418 k. Consent, Express or
Implied. Most Cited Cases
Since a person who drives a motor vehicle
is deemed to have given his or her consent
to chemical testing, a drunken driver has
no right to resist or refuse such a test,

notwithstanding statutory sanctions for a
driver's refusal to submit to chemical tests.
West's Ann.Ca1.Vehicle Code $8 13353,
23612.
***752 Richard B. Lennon, Los Angeles,
under appointment by the Supreme Court,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Thomas W. Sneddon, Jr., District
Attorney, and Gerald McC. Franklin,
Deputy District Attorney, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
David Labahn, Sacramento; George
Kennedy, District Attorney (Santa Clara)
and Neal J. Kimball, Deputy District
Attorney, for California District Attorneys
Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of
Plaintiff and Respondent.
BAXTER, J.
**4 "814 A concerned citizen followed
defendant, who was driving dangerously
and under the influence of alcohol, through
the streets of Santa Barbara in the early
evening of July 21, 2003. Although
defendant sped away *815 and managed to
get home, the police, with that citizen's
assistance, anived at the house a short time
later. The officers spoke to defendant,
who remained inside the house and was
visibly intoxicated. When defendant
refused to come outside to have his blood
tested for the presence of alcohol, the
police became anxious about the
in his
dissipation of alcohol ""5
bloodstream and entered the house without
a warrant to arrest him for the criminal
offense of driving under the influence
(DUI).
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Relying on Welsh v. Wisconsin (1984) 466
U.S. 740, 104 S.Ct. 2091, 80 L.Ed.2d 732 (
Welsh ), the Court of Appeal determined
that the Fourth Amendment categorically
prohibits warrantless entries into the home
to effect a DUI arrest when the asserted
exigency is merely to prevent the
destruction of blood-alcohol evidence.
Based on its conclusion that the arrest was
unlawful, the Court of Appeal suppressed
all the evidence seized during and after the
warrantless entry.
Because the Court of Appeal has misread
Welsh and because exigent circumstances
justified the warrantless entry to effect the
DUI arrest here, we reverse the Court of
Appeal. We therefore need not consider
the People's additional argument that even
if the arrest violated the Fourth
Amendment, evidence seized outside the
home subsequent to the arrest-including
the results of a blood-alcohol test-are
nonetheless admissible under New York v.
Harris (1990) 495 U.S. 14, 110 S.Ct. 1640,
109 L.Ed.2d 13.
Background
On July 21, 2003, Madelene Orvos
returned to her apartment complex in Santa
Barbara from a walk at the beach with her
dogs. She found defendant Daniel Lyon
Thompson passed out in a white Ford
Bronco in her assigned parking space. A
neighbor came out, woke defendant up,
and asked him to leave. Before defendant
left, Orvos saw him stumble around, toss

an empty vodka bottle out of the Bronco,
and pass out a second time in the vehicle.
She could tell he was intoxicated.
***753 Having seen defendant in this
condition on many prior occasions, Orvos
decided this time to follow defendant and
called 91 1 to report the situation as she got
into her car. Defendant ran a red light and
drove about 70 miles per hour when he got
onto the freeway, at one point going "way
to his right ... close to the concrete on the
side of the road." He exited the freeway
and turned right onto State Street from the
center lane. After defendant turned right
onto South Ontare Road, Orvos fell behind
because he was running stop signs and
driving too fast in a neighborhood where
children were present. Fortunately, Santa
Barbara Police Officer Adrian Gutierrez
arrived at 7:15 *816 p.m., just as Orvos
lost track of the Bronco. Gutierrez
instructed Orvos to wait at the parking lot
of the nearby golf course while he
continued the pursuit.
Officer Gutierrez proceeded to 3610 San
Jose Lane, which was the address of the
Bronco's registered owner, and found the
white Bronw parked in fiont. When
Officer Ryan Dejohn anived to assist,
Gutierrez went back to update Orvos and
ask her to follow him to identifL the
vehicle. After Orvos did so, Gutierrez
touched the hood of the vehicle and
discovered the hood was warm, indicating
the Bronco had been driven very recently.
He and Dejohn approached the front door,
which was wide open, and rang the
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doorbell.
Slavka Kovarick answered the door.
Officer Dejohn asked her who had been
driving the Bronco. Kovarick said that
Daniel owned the vehicle. Dejohn asked
to speak to him, but Kovarick said he was
asleep. When Dejohn asked whether she
could wake Daniel up, Kovarick entered a
bedroom directly to the left of the front
door. She remained there a few moments
and came back to tell them she could not
wake Daniel up. She also refused to let
the officers inside and instead walked away.
Officer Dejohn heard people speaking
softly down the hall and then saw a tall
shirtless White male, about 45 years old,
leave the house and go into the backyard.
This man, later identified as defendant,
matched the description ONOS had
provided of the driver. When defendant
turned around, he made eye contact with
Dejohn, who motioned for him to come to
the fiont door. Defendant reentered the
house and approached the officers by
exiting the bedroom door near the
entryway. He was staggering or swaying
slightly, slurring his speech, and gave off a
strong odor of alcohol. Dejohn, who
addressed defendant as Daniel, explained
that they suspected him of driving under
the influence of **6 alcohol and wanted to
talk to him and perform some tests, but
defendant refused to cooperate. As
defendant began to walk away, Dejohn
entered the house. He was afraid
defendant might flee, so he placed his hand
on defendant's shoulder. Defendant

turned around and grabbed the doorjamb to
the bedroom near the entryway. Officer
Gutierrez entered the house only to assist
Dejohn in effecting the arrest.
After defendant was handcuffed, Owos
identified defendant as the driver. His
blood test revealed a blood-alcohol level. of
0.21 percent. On the way to the jail,
defendant told Officer Dejohn, "I'll kick
your fucking ass."
Following a hearing on defendant's motion
to suppress, the trial court found there was
probable cause to arrest defendant based
on Orvos's report of the driver's behavior,
defendant's resemblance to the description
Owos "817 had provided of the driver, and
defendant's visible intoxication. Under
these circumstances, it was a "reasonable
implication" that defendant was the driver.
Relying on ***754PeopEe v. Hampron
(1985) 164 Cal.App.3d 27, 209 Cal.Rptr.
905, the trial court also found that the
warrantless entry to arrest defendant was
justified by exigent circumstances-i.e., the
need to preserve the evidence of
defendant's blood-alcohol level.
Defendant then pleaded no contest to
driving with a blood-alcohol level in
excess of 0.08 percent (Veh.Code, $
23152, subd. (b)) and to resisting an officer
in the performance of his duties (Pen.Code,
$ 148, subd. (a)(l)) and admitted two prior
convictions within the meaning of Vehicle
Code section 23546. He was sentenced to
24 months, execution of which was
suspended for three years under specified

O 2006 Thomsoflest. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.

Page 8 of 30

135 P.3d 3

Page 7

38 Cal.4th 81 1, 135 P.3d 3,43 Cal.Rptr.3d 750,06 Cal. Daily Op. Sew. 4587,2006 Daily Journal D.A.R
(Cite as: 38 CalAth 811,135 P.3d 3)
conditions.
A divided panel of the Appellate Division
of the Santa Barbara County Superior
Court affirmed the denial of the
suppression motion, relying on "[tlhe
exigencies of preventing defendant from
fleeing and possibly again driving while
intoxicated, and of preserving evidence of
his blood alcohol content." The Court of
Appeal transferred the matter under rule 62
of the California Rules of Court and
reversed in a published opinion. The
court disagreed that defendant "was likely
to flee and again drive while intoxicated"
and declared that the likelihood evidence
of driving under the influence would be
concealed or destroyed by the passage of
time could not justify a warrantless entry
into a residence under Welsh.
We granted the People's petition for review.
Discussion
[1][2] "The Fourth Amendment protects '
[tlhe right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures.
' In conformity with the rule at common
law, a warrantless arrest by a law officer is
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment
where there is probable cause to believe
that a criminal offense has been or is being
committed." (Devenpeck v. Alford (2004)
543 U.S. 146, 152, 125 S.Ct. 588, 160
L.Ed.2d 537.) When, as here, the arrest
occurs in the home, additional principles

come into play. "It is a 'basic principle of
Fourth Amendment law' that searches and
seizures inside a home without a warrant
are presumptively unreasonable." (Payton
v. New York (1980) 445 U.S. 573, 586, 100
S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639.) Indeed, "the
'physical entry of the home is the chief
evil against which the wording of the
Fourth Amendment is directed.' " (Id. at p.
585, 100 S.Ct. 1371.) The requirement of
a warrant "minimizes the danger of
needless intrusions of that sort." (Id. at p.
586, 100 S.Ct. 1371.)
[3] Yet, as with so much of its Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence, the high court
has stopped short of erecting a categorical
"818
bar.
The
presumption
of
unreasonableness that attaches to a
wanantless entry into the home " can be
overcome by a showing of one of the few '
specifically established and well-delineated
exceptions' to the warrant requirement (
Katz v. United States (1967) 389 U.S. 347,
357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576), such
as ' "hot pursuit of a fleeing felon, or
imminent destruction of evidence, ... or the
need to prevent a suspect's escape, or the
risk of danger to the police or to other
persons inside or outside the dwelling3'**7
' (Minnesota v. Olson (1990) 495 U.S. 91,
100, 110 S.Ct. 1684, 109 L.Ed.2d 85).
The United States Supreme Court has
indicated that entry into a home based on
exigent circumstances requires probable
cause to believe that the entry is justified
by one of these factors such as the
imminent destruction of evidence or the
need to prevent a suspect's escape." (
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People v. Celis (2004) 33 Cal.4th 667, 676,
16 Cal.Rptr.3d 85, 93 P.3d 1027.)
***755
Defendant asserts that the
warrantless entry here was unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment. He argues
in particular that the police lacked probable
cause to arrest him and that, even if
probable cause existed, Welsh precluded a
finding of exigent circumstances for
warrantless DUI arrests in the home.

The trial court found that probable cause
existed to arrest defendant and that the
warrantless entry was justified by exigent
circumstances. Because the underlying
facts are undisputed, we review the trial
court's rulings independently. (People v.
Williams (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1268, 1301, 248
Cal.Rptr. 834,756 P.2d 221.)

A. Did Probable Cause Exist to Justify
an Arrest of Defendant for DUI?
[4][5][6][7] We first consider whether the
officers had probable cause to arrest
defendant for DUI. "Probable cause exists
when the facts known to the arresting
officer would persuade someone of '
reasonable caution' that the person to be
arrested has
committed a crime.
[Citation.] '[Plrobable cause is a fluid
concept-turning on the assessment of
probabilities in particular factual contexts...
.' (Illinois v. Gates (1983) 462 U.S. 213,
232, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527.) It
is incapable of precise definition. (
Maiyland v. Pringle (2003) 540 U.S. 366,

371, 124 S.Ct. 795, 157 L.Ed.2d 769.) ' "
The substance of all the definitions of
probable cause is a reasonable ground for
belief of guilt," ' and that belief must be '
particularized with respect to the person to
be ... seized.' (Ibid.)" (People v. Celis,
supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 673, 16 Cal.Rptr.3d
85,93 P.3d 1027.)
That standard was satisfied here.
Although Madelene Orvos did not see
defendant drinking, she did see him have
difficulty walking, toss an empty "819
vodka bottle out of the Bronco, and pass
out again in the vehicle. When he woke
up, he drove erratically and too fast. He
also ran red lights and stop signs. As
defendant concedes, the record fully
supported Orvos's belief, which she
communicated to the police, that the driver
of the Bronco was intoxicated. Orvos's
report thus established probable cause to
justify a warrantless arrest of the Bronco's
driver. (Veh.Code, $ 40300.5; People v.
Schofield (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 968,
972-975, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 429; see
generally People v. Smith (1976) 17
Cal.3d 845, 852, 132 Ca1.Rptr. 397, 553
P.2d 557 [citizen-informant who has
personally observed the commission of a
crime "is presumptively reliable"].)
The officers also had ample justification
for suspecting that defendant had been the
driver of the Bronco. The registered
owner of the vehicle lived at 3610 San Jose
Lane. A Bronco was parked in front of that
residence, and Orvos confmed that this
was the vehicle she had just been
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following. Officer Gutierrez touched the
Bronco's hood and concluded that it had
been driven very recently. The officers
went to the door and inquired who had
been driving the Bronco. Slavka Kovarick
said that the Bronco belonged to Daniel
and that she "was going to call Daniel out"
to speak to them. Kovarick went into the
bedroom immediately to the left of the
front door and came out a short time later
to say she could not wake Daniel up.
Shortly thereafter, Officer Dejohn heard
quiet voices coming from down the hall
and then saw defendant, a tall White male,
approximately 45 years old and shirtless,
walk out the back door. At Dejohn's
invitation, defendant walked back into the
house and approached the entryway by
exiting through the bedroom door
immediately to the left of the front door.
He was staggering and swaying, slurring
his speech, and smelled of alcohol. His
appearance***756 and demeanor matched
the description of the driver provided by
Orvos. He also had walked into and out
of the bedroom that belonged to Daniel.
The officers, having reasonable grounds
for believing that defendant was Daniel
and that Daniel was the driver, thus had
probable cause to arrest him for DUI.
**8 Defendant claims probable cause was
nonetheless
lacking
because
the
description Owos had provided was too
general to justify suspicion of any
individual person. He cites People v.
Curtis (1969) 70 Cal.2d 347, 74 Cal.Rptr.
713, 450 P.2d 33, in which a "cursory
description" of the suspect's race, color of

clothing, and presence in the neighborhood
where a prowler has been reported was
deemed sufficient to justify a detention but
not an arrest (id. at p. 350, 74 Cal.Rptr.
713, 450 P.2d 33), and on People v.
Mickelson (1963) 59 Cal.2d 448, 30
Cal.Rptr. 18, 380 P.2d 658, in which the
suspect's description as a fairly tall White
man of large build with dark hair and a red
sweater likewise failed to justify the arrest
of a man matching that description who
was merely in the "neighborhood" where a
robbery had occurred more than 20
minutes earlier and was "driving toward
the scene of the crime, not away from it." (
Id. at pp. 450, 454, 30 Cal.Rptr. 18, 380
P.2d 658.) But we have in this case much
more than a vague description *820 of a
suspect that happens to be matched by
someone in the general neighborhood
where a crime occurred. The Bronco was
traced to a particular residence by its
registration as well as by Orvos's visual
identification and the fact the engine was
still warm. Kovarick told the officers that
Daniel, the owner of the Bronco, was
indeed home and that she would tell him to
come to the door. Only then did a man
matching Orvos's description attempt to
flee from the house, although he eventually
came to the door-after passing through
Daniel's bedroom. When the man arrived
at the front door, the officers immediately
could tell that he was intoxicated. These
additional facts soundly distinguish Curtis
and Mickelson. (People v. Schader (1965)
62 Cal.2d 716, 724, 44 Cal.Rptr. 193, 401
P.2d 665; In re Louis F. (1978) 85
Cal.App.3d 611, 616, 149 Cal.Rptr. 642 ["
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Curtis and Mickelson should not be
understood as standing for the proposition
identification data furnished to a police
officer can never alone be sufficient to
justify a warrantless arrest unless there
could not have been anyone other than the
person arrested who could have fit the
description. Rather, the question is one of
degree.
And
when
identification
information of the kind here present is
buttressed by additional probative evidence
of complicity, it cannot be maintained
probable cause was lacking"].)
[8] Defendant also errs in supposing that
the officers' lack of certainty defendant was
the driver precludes a finding of probable
cause. " '[Slufficient probability, not
certainty,
is
the
touchstone
of
reasonableness
under
the
Fourth
Amendment.' " (Maryland v. Garrison
(1987) 480 U.S. 79, 87, 107 S.Ct. 1013, 94
L.Ed.2d 72.)
B. Did Exigent Circumstances JustiQ a
Warrantless Entry to Effect the Arrest?
[9][10] The imminent destruction of
evidence is an exigent circumstance
justifying a warrantless entry into a
residence to effect an arrest. (People v.
Celis, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 676, 16
Cal.Rptr.3d 85, 93 P.3d 1027.) The
People
contend
that
the. body's
metabolization of alcohol qualified as the
imminent
destruction
of
evidence
justifying a warrantless entry. Defendant
disagrees, relying largely on Welsh.

Welsh held that the need to ascertain a
suspect's blood-alcohol level did not justify
a warrantless entry into a residence to
effect an arrest for driving under the
influencex**757 in Wisconsin. (Welsh,
supra, 466 U.S. at pp. 753-754, 104 S.Ct.
2091.) Welsh did not dispute the
evanescent character of evidence of
intoxication. Rather, the high court
invalidated' the arrest because "an
important factor to be considered when
determining whether any exigency exists is
the gravity of the underlying offense for
which the arrest is being made." (Id. at p.
753, 104 S.Ct. 2091; see also Brigharn
City v. Stuart (May 22, 2006, No. 05-502)
--- U.S. ----,----, 126 S.Ct 1943, --L.Ed.2d ---- [2006 WL 1374566, 31.) "
[Tlhe best indication of the State's interest
in precipitating *821 an arrest," the court
explained, is the classification of the
offense and the possible punishment,
which "can be easily identified both by the
courts and by officers faced with a decision
to arrest." (Welsh, supra, at p. 754, 104
S.Ct. 2091 .)
Defendant, like the Court of Appeal here,
reasons that DUI is likewise a minor
offense in California and, under Welsh,
cannot justify **9 a warrantless entry to
effect an arrest. We disagree. Wisconsin
has chosen to classify a first offense for
DUI as a noncriminal, civil forfeiture
offense for which no imprisonment is
possible. (Welsh, supra, 466 U.S. at p.
754, 104 S.Ct. 2091, citing Wis. Stat. 4
346.65(2) (1975).) The issue thus
presented in Welsh, as the high court
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explicitly stated, was whether " the Fourth
Amendment prohibits the police from
making a warrantless night entry of a
person's home in order to arrest him for a
nonjailable traffic offense."
(Welsh,
supra, 466 U.S. at p. 742, 104 S.Ct. 2091,
italics added.) California, by contrast,
classifies a first offense for driving under
the influence as a criminal act that is
punishable by no more than six months
and no less than 96 hours in jail. (
Veh.Code,
23536, subd. (a).) The
possibility of imprisonment distinguishes
DUI in California from DUI in Wisconsin.
Other factors confim that, in California,
driving under the influence is not an "
extremely minor" offense within the
meaning of Welsh, supra, 466 U.S. at page
753, 104 S.Ct. 2091. When the
Legislature amended Vehicle Code section
40300.5 to allow warrantless arrests for
this misdemeanor offense not committed in
the presence of the officer, it found and
declared "that driving while under the
influence of alcohol or drugs continues to
pose a substantial danger to public health
and safety, injuring over 65,000 people per
year and killing an additional 2,400.
Given the severity of the conduct involved,
the exception in Section 40300.5 of the
Vehicle
Code
from
the
general
requirements of Section 836 of the Penal
Code should be expanded to cover other
instances in which the officer has
reasonable cause to believe that the person
to be arrested had been driving while under
the influence of alcohol, drugs, or both."
(Stats.1984, ch. 722, 2, pp. 2646-2647;

see also People v. SchoJield, supra, 90
Cal.App.4th at p. 973, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 429
["The Legislature has recognized that
driving under the influence is widespread
and serious with potential for catastrophic
consequences"].) This court, too, has
recognized the "monstrous proportions of
the problem" as well as "the horrific risk
posed by those who drink and drive" (Burg
v. Municipal Court (1983) 35 Cal.3d 257,
262, 198 Cal.Rptr. 145, 673 P.2d 732) and
has declared its "resolve to support 'all
possible means of deterring persons from
driving automobiles after drinking.' " (
Peterson v. Superior Court (1982) 3 1
Cal.3d 147, 155, 181 Cal.Rptr. 784, 642
P.2d 1305.) We therefore believe Welsh
was limited to Wisconsin's "amazing"
decision to classify DUI as a civil
nonjailable offense (Welsh, supra, 466
U.S. at p. 755, 104 S.Ct. 2091 (conc. opn.
of Blackmun, J.)) and not as a categorical
bar on warrantless arrests in the home for
DUI in the vast majority of states that, like
California, classify it as a ***758 crime
with the possibility of imprisonment. "822
(People v.
Hampton, supra,
164
Cal.App.3d 27, 34, 209 Cal.Rptr. 905; see
also Welsh, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 761, 104
S.Ct. 2091 (dis. opn. of White, J.) ["a
bright-line distinction between felonies and
misdemeanors
is
untenable";
"the
Court-wisely in my view-does not adopt
such an approach"].)
Illinois v. McArthur (2001) 531 U.S. 326,
121 S.Ct. 946, 148 L.Ed.2d 838 (McArthur
), which construed the scope of exigent
circumstances in the related circumstance

I
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of preventing a suspect from entering his
own home, provides additional support for
our understanding of Welsh. In McArthur,
the police suspected that marijuana had
been hidden underneath the couch of the
trailer where McArthur was living. The
police informed McArthur of their
suspicions and asked for permission to
search the trailer, which McArthur denied.
While one officer went to get a search
warrant, McArthur was told he could not
reenter the trailer unless an officer
accompanied
him.
McArthur
then
reentered the trailer two or three times, and
each time an officer stood just inside the
door to observe what McArthur did.
About two hours later, an officer returned
with the warrant and found a small amount
of marijuana in the trailer. (McArthur,
supra, 531 U.S. at p. 329, 121 S.Ct. 946.)
Relying on Welsh, McArthur argued that
misdemeanor possession of marijuana,
which was punishable in Illinois by up to
30 days in jail, was too minor an offense to
justify the warrantless restraint he had
suffered. (McArthur, at pp. 335-336, 121
S.Ct. 946.) The high court disagreed,
reiterating that " 'the penalty that may
attach to any particular offense seems to
**I0 provide the clearest and most
consistent indication of the State's interest
in arresting individuals suspected of
committing that offense' " (id. at p. 336,
121 S.Ct. 946, quoting Welsh, supra, 466
U.S. at p. 754, fn. 14, 104 S.Ct. 2091.) and
finding "significant distinctions" between "
crimes that were 'jailable,' not '
nonjailable.' " (McArthur, at p. 336, 121
S.Ct. 946; see also id. at p. 337, 121 S.Ct.

946 (conc. opn. of Souter, J.) [observing
that the risk of destruction of evidence of
the misdemeanor would have justified a
warrantless entry into the trailer].)
A substantial majority of our sister
jurisdictions have limited Welsh's holding
to nonjailable offenses and have thereby
rejected defendant's extension of its rule to
misdemeanor
offenses
where
imprisonment is a potential penalty. (
Mendez v. People (Colo.1999) 986 P.2d
275, 283 [distinguishing Welsh as
involving "a minor, civil, nonjailable
Dolan
v.
Salinas
offense"];
(Conn.Super.Ct.1999) 1999 WL 566943,
*4, 1999 Conn.Super. LEXIS 1988, *13 ["
Unlike the State of Wisconsin, Connecticut
provides for incarceration on a first
conviction" for DUI]; Dyer v. State
(Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1996) 680 So.2d 612, 613
[a misdemeanor punishable by up to a year
in jail is "classified as a much more serious
offense than in Welsh "I; i'%reatl v. State
(1999) 240 Ga.App. 592, 524 S.E.2d 276,
280 (Iltreatt ) [distinguishing Welsh
because DUI, which is punishable by
imprisonment of 10 days to 12 months, is "
sufficiently serious criminal activity to
justify
an
officer's
warrantless,
nonconsensual entry into a suspect's home
to arrest the suspect"]; People v. Lagle
(1990) 200 IIl.App.3d 948, 146 I1l.Dec.
551, 558 N.E.2d 514, 519 [distinguishing
Welsh because *823 DUI, a misdemeanor,
is "considered a serious offense in Illinois"
1; State v. Legg (Iowa 2001) 633 N.W.2d
763, 773 [distinguishing Welsh because
DUI, which is punishable by two days to
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one year in jail, is a "serious misdemeanor"
1; State v. Paul (Minn.1996) 548 N.W.2d
260, 267 [distinguishing Welsh because
DUI is a misdemeanor***759 and the
legislature had authorized warrantless
arrests for this offense when it occurs
outside the officer's presence]; City of
Kirhville v. Guffey (Mo.Ct.App. 1987) 740
S.W.2d 227, 229 [distinguishing Welsh
because DUI is punishable by up to six
months in jail]; State v. Ellinger (1986)
223 Mont. 349, 725 P.2d 1201, 1204
[distinguishing Welsh because DUI is a
criminal offense with the possibility of
imprisonment];
State
v.
Nikola
(App.Div.2003) 359 N.J.Super. 573, 821
A.2d 110, 118 [distinguishing Welsh
because "in this State a charge of driving
while under the influence of alcohol may
subject an offender to a jail term of up to
thirty days even for a first offense"];
People v. Odenweller (1988) 137 A.D.2d
15, 527 N.Y.S.2d 127, 129 [distinguishing
Welsh because DUI is punishable by up to
one year in jail]; Beachwood v. Sims
(1994) 98 Ohio App.3d 9, 647 N.E.2d 821,
825 [distinguishing Welsh because DUI is
a misdemeanor punishable by a minimum
term of three days in jail]; State v. Roberts
(1985) 75 Or.App. 292, 706 P.2d 564, 566
[distinguishing Welsh because DUI is a
misdemeanor punishable by up to one year
in jail]; Beaver v. State (Tex.App.2003)
106 S.W.3d 243, 248 [distinguishing Welsh
"ti-om cases, such as this one, where the
offense is 'jailable' "I; City of Orem v.
Henrie (Utah Ct.App.1994) 868 P.2d 1384,
1392 [distinguishing Welsh because DUI is
a
misdemeanor
punishable
by

imprisonment]; Cherry v. Com. (2004) 44
Va.App. 347, 605 S.E.2d 297, 307 ["if any
bright line exists for warrantless entries
into the home, it should be drawn between
jailable and nonjailable offenses rather
than between felonies and misdemeanors"
1; State v. Grvjth (1991) 61 Wash.App.
35, 808 P.2d 1171, 1176 & fn. 7
[distinguishing Welsh as a case involving a
noncriminal, civil forfeiture offense
without possible imprisonment]; Goines v.
James (1993) 189 W.Va. 634, 433 S.E.2d
572, 577-578 [distinguishing Welsh
because DUI is a serious traffic offense
punishable by up to six months in jail];
State v. Hughes (2000) 233 Wis.2d 280,
607 N.W.2d 621, 631 [distinguishing Welsh
because the misdemeanor offense was
punishable by up to six months in jail];
Rideout v. State (Wyo.2005) 122 P.3d 201,
210 ["The unmistakable implication of the
discussion in McArthur is that the
distinction drawn by the Court in Welsh
between minor offenses that do not justify
a warrantless entry into a residence and
those offenses that do is predicated upon
whether the subject offense carries a
potential jail term"]; accord, **11Joyce v.
Town of Tewhbuuy, Mass. (1st (3.1997)
112 F.3d 19, 22 (en banc) ["the fact that
Massachusetts classifies the alleged
violation here as a misdemeanor does not
reduce it to a 'minor offense' " within the
meaning of Welsh I.).)
*824 Against this impressive array of
authority, we have found only three courts
that, like the Court of Appeal below, have
extended Welsh to misdemeanors canying
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a possibility of imprisonment. In Patzner
v. Burkett (8th Cir. 1985) 779 F.2d 1363,
the Eighth Circuit asserted, without much
analysis, that the punishment for DUI in
North Dakota-a minimum sentence of a
$100 fine or three days in jail-was only a "
minor difference in penalty" and thus was "
not sufficient to support a result different
from that reached in Welsh," inasmuch as
the state had since amended its statute to
eliminate the possibility of imprisonment
for first-time offenders. (Patzner, supra,
779 F.2d at pp. 1368-1369 & fn. 6.) In
State v. Flegel (S.D.1992) 485 N.W.2d 210,
the South Dakota Supreme Court made
the remarkable assertion that the
misdemeanor penalties for first-offense
DUI, which ranged up to one year in jail,
were "similar" to those attaching to the
nonjailable traffic offense in Welsh and the
misdemeanor penalties in Patzner. (
Flegel, supra, 485 N.W.2d at p. 215.)
And in ***760 Norris v. State (1999) 338
Ark. 397, 993 S.W.2d 918, the Arkansas
Supreme Court held that DUI, which was
punishable by up to one year in jail, was "
relatively minor" when compared to
criminal offenses involving violence or the
threat of violence. (Id. at p. 923; but see 3
LaFave, Search and Seizure (4th ed.2004) 5
6.1(.f), p. 316, fn. 211 [criticizing Norris

I.))
We do not find these decisions persuasive.
First of all, they ignore Welsh itself, which
cautions that the critical factor is not the
nature of the crime but "the penalty that
may attach to any particular offense." (
Welsh, 466 U.S. at p. 754, fn. 14, 104 S.Ct.

2091; see also Colb, The Qualitative
Dimension of Fourth Amendment "
Reasonableness " (1998) 98 Colum.
L.Rev. 1642, 1683 ["If Wisconsin were
unhappy with the Court's decision, it could,
therefore, nullify it prospectively by simply
changing (legislatively) the status of
driving while intoxicated from a civil
violation to a criminal offense''].) Indeed,
they all predate McArthur, which clarified
that the significant distinction for Fourth
Amendment purposes in an analogous
context is whether the crimes were " '
jailable' " or " 'nonjailable.' " (McArthur,
supra, 531 U.S. at p. 336, 121 S.Ct. 946.)
Moreover,
none
of
these
cases
acknowledges the substantial weight of
authority limiting Welsh to nonjailable
offenses-or even cites a single contrary
case. Finally, a bright-line rule limiting
warrantless entries to felonies "would send
a message to the 'bad man' who drinks
and drives that a hot pursuit or arrest set in
motion can be thwarted by beating the
police to one's door. The Fourth
Amendment simply cannot be stretched
nor can public safety be ensured by a
bright-line felony rule which would
encourage drunk drivers to elude the police
by racing through the streets to the
sanctuary of their houses in order to 'freeze
' a hot pursuit or to otherwise evade a
lawful arrest." (State v. Paul, supra, 548
N. W.2d at p. 268.)
If, as we have concluded, a finding of
exigent circumstances in DUI cases is not
categorically precluded by Welsh, we must
next consider whether "825 exigent
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circumstances justified the warrantless
entry in this particular case. The People
rely on the exception to the warrant
requirement for the imminent destruction
of evidence. They point out (1) that
defendant's blood-alcohol level would have
diminished while the police sought a
warrant as the body metabolized the
alcohol, and (2) that defendant could have
masked his blood-alcohol level while the
police sought a warrant by ingesting more
alcohol. The People's concerns are well
founded.
It is beyond dispute that "the percentage of
alcohol in the blood begins to diminish
shortly after drinking stops, as the body
functions to eliminate it from the system."
(Schmerber v. California (1966) 384 U.S.
757, 770, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908.)
Because the "delay necessary to procure a
warrant ... may result in the destruction of
valuable evidence," "blood and breath
samples taken to measure whether these
substances were in the bloodstream when a
triggering event occurred must be obtained
as soon as possible." **12(Skinner v.
Railway Labor Executives' Assn. (1989)
489 U.S. 602, 623, 109 S.Ct. 1402, 103
L.Ed.2d 639.) Neither defendant nor the
dissenting opinion here offers any reason
why the dissipation of blood-alcohol
evidence may be deemed to threaten the
imminent destruction of evidence in
Schmerber and in Skinner but not in this
case. Nor does defendant offer any
authority for his assertion at oral argument
that the exigent circumstance relating to
the imminent destruction of evidence

encompasses only that evidence which
qualifies as contraband or as an
instrumentality of a crime. To the
contrary,***761
most
courts
have
concluded that the dissipation of
blood-alcohol evidence "may constitute an
exigent circumstance under the facts of a
particular case." (City of Orem v. Henrie,
supra, 868 P.2d at p. 1389; accord,
Threatt, supra, 524 S.E.2d at p. 281, fn. 1 [
"when an officer has probable cause to
arrest for the offense of DUI, the need to
prevent destruction of evidence (which
may occur by the dissipation of alcohol
from a DUI suspect's blood while a warrant
is obtained) may constitute an exigent
circumstance which could justify a
nonconsensual, warrantless entry into the
suspect's home to arrest the suspect"];
State v. Komoto (1985) 40 Wash.App. 200,
697 P.2d 1025, 1033 ["This proposition is
generally accepted by federal and state
courts"]; State v. Bohling (1993) 173
Wis.2d 529, 494 N.W.2d 399, 404-405
[citing cases]; U.S. v. Reid (4th Cir.1991)
929 F.2d 990,993-994.) FN1
FNI. The dissent concedes that the
dissipation
of
blood-alcohol
evidence may constitute an exigent
circumstance
to
justify
a
warrantless entry to effect an arrest,
but would limit such arrests to
crimes "far more serious than mere
driving under the influence." (Dis.
opn., post, 43 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 767,
135 P.3d at p. 17.) The text of the
Fourth
Amendment,
however,
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offers no basis for distinguishing
between DUI, which is a serious
and jailable offense in California
(see ante, at pp. 757-758, 135 P.3d
at pp. 8-9), and the crimes alleged
in Henrie and Komoto, nor does the
dissent point to any case law to
support such a distinction. Indeed,
inasmuch as the dissent concedes
that the nonjailable offense in Welsh
is distinguishable from the jailable
offense in this case (dis. opn., post,
at p. 765, 135 P.3d at p. 15), the
line the dissent would draw
between this case and Henrie or
Komoto remains undefined.
*826 Defendant contends that no exigency
existed because there is a rebuttable
presumption that a driver had a
blood-alcohol level of 0.08 percent or
more at the time of driving if the person
had a blood-alcohol level of 0.08 percent
or more in a chemical test performed "
within three hours after the driving." (
Veh.Code, § 23152, subd. (b).) Defendant
misapprehends the significance of this
provision, which is not a presumption at
all, but only a permissive inference.
(Judicial Council of Cal., Jury Instns.
(2006) Bench Note to CALCRIM No.
21 11, p. 149; accord, Use Note to CALJIC
No. 12.61.1 (Jan.2005 ed.) p. 845.) That
the jury may, but is not required to,
conclude that defendant's blood-alcohol
level was in excess of legal limits based on
a test taken within three hours of the
driving does not eviscerate the People's
interest in securing a blood test as soon as

possible. (State v. Bohling, supra, 494
N.W.2d at p. 405; City of Orem v. Henrie,
supra, 868 P.2d at p. 1393, fn. 10 [such a
limitation "evinces the Legislature's intent
to promote the rapid attainment of
chemical tests for alcohol content"].)
[ l l ] We are likewise unpersuaded by
defendant's claim that any exigency is
eliminated because of the possibility an
expert could testify about the defendant's
blood-alcohol level at an earlier point "by
extrapolating
backward
from
the
later-taken results." As courts have
recognized, "such extrapolations can be
speculative." (State v. Bohling, supra, 494
N.W.2d at p. 405.) "[Tlhere are numerous
variables such as weight, or time and
content of last meal which may affect the
rate at which the alcohol dissipates." (
Carleton v. Superior Court (1985) 170
Cal.App.3d 1182, 1185, 216 Cal.Rptr. 890;
see also Bennett v. Cornan (1987) 178
W.Va. 500, 361 S.E.2d 465, 469 [degree of
physical exertion can affect body's
metabolism of alcohol].) FN2
FN2. Defendant also argues that a
person suspected of DUI may
refuse to submit to chemical testing
and
accept
the
specified
punishment,
rendering
the
blood-alcohol
evidence
superfluous. Defendant once again
misapprehends
the
statutory
scheme. A person who drives a
motor vehicle "is deemed to have
given his or her consent to
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chemical testing" of his or her
blood, breath, or urine for the
purpose
of
determining the
alcoholic or drug content of his or
23612,
her blood (Veh.Code,
subds.(a)(l)(A) & (£41, (d)(2)). "It
is thus firmly established that a
drunken driver has no right to resist
or refuse such a test." (Bush v.
Bright (1968) 264 Cal.App.2d 788,
792, 71 Cal.Rptr. 123.) Moreover,
the possibility of sanctions under
Vehicle Code section 13353 for the
driver's refusal to submit to
chemical tests does not preclude
the People from also obtaining a
blood sample without any further
approval, based on the consent any
driver has given under section
23612, and punishing the driver for
the criminal act of driving under
the influence. (Covington v.
Department of Motor Vehicles
(1980) 102 Cal.App.3d 54, 60, 162
Cal.Rptr. 150; People v. Fite
(1968) 267 Cal.App.2d 685,
690-691,73 Cal.Rptr. 666.)

supra, 466 U.S. at p. 763, 104 S.Ct. 2091
(dis. opn. of White, J.); State v. Lovig
(Iowa 2004) 675 N.W.2d 557, 566 & fn. 2;
State v. Legg, supra, 633 N.W.2d at pp.
772-773; State v. Seamans, supra, 2005
Me.Super. LEXIS 105, * I 1, fn. 3; State v.
Paul, supra, 548 N.W.2d at p. 267; City of
Kirksville v. Gufey, supra, 740 S.W.2d at
p. 229; People v. Odenweller, supra, 527
N.Y.S.2d at p. 129; Stark v. N Y. State
Dept. of Motor Vehicles (1984) 104
A.D.2d 194, 483 N.Y.S.2d 824, 826-827,
affd. (1985) 65 N.Y.2d 720, 492 N.Y.S.2d
8, 9, 481 N.E.2d 548; City of Orem v.
Henrie, supra, 868 P.2d at p. 1393; State
v. Komoto, supra, 697 P.2d at p. 1033.) In
this case, the corruption of evidence was
not merely a theoretical possibility. The
officers had good reason to believe that
defendant, who had attempted to flee out
the back door upon learning of their
presence, would escape again or otherwise
act to conceal his intoxication if given the
opportunity. (See People v. Murphy
(2005) 37 Cal.4th 490, 500, 36 Cal.Rptr.3d
125, 123 P.3d 155.) Time was of the
essence here.

***762 **I3 In any event, none of
defendant's arguments is responsive to the
corruption of evidence that occurs when
the suspect takes advantage of any delay to
ingest more alcohol-or to claim to have
done so-or when the suspect evades police
capture until he or she is no longer
intoxicated. Numerous courts have
recognized this possibility as an additional
reason supporting a finding of exigent
circumstances in DUI cases. *827(Welsh,

In holding that exigent circumstances
justified the warrantless entry here, we
need not decide-and do not hold-that the
police may enter a home without a warrant
to effect an arrest of a DUI suspect in every
case. We hold merely that the police
conduct here, taking into account ail of the
circumstances,
was
reasonable-with
reasonableness measured as " 'a balance
between the public interest and the
individual's right to personal secuxity free
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from arbitrary interference by law officers.'
v. Mimms (1977) 434
U.S. 106, 109, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d
331; accord, People v. Rarney (1976) 16
Cal.3d 263, 276, 127 Cal.Rptr. 629, 545
P.2d 1333 ["There is no ready litmus test
for
determining
whether
such
circumstances exist, and in each case the
claim of an extraordinary situation must be
measured by the facts known to the officers
"I.)

" (Pennsylvania

The state's interest in effecting an arrest
here was substantial. There was strong
evidence that defendant had committed the
dangerous act of DUI, a jailable offense.
Officer Dejohn feared, however, the
evidence of that crime was in imminent
danger of destruction. His suspicions
were justified. Slavka Kovarick had told
the police, alternately, that defendant
would be coming to the door soon, and that
he was asleep and could not be woken up,
but he was in fact neither sleeping nor
coming to the door. Instead, he spoke
quietly in the hall with Kovarick and then
***763 walked away from the officers into
the backyard. The police were able to see
defendant leave the house only because the
front door was open, and defendant
returned to the house only after Officer
Dejohn made eye contact with him and.
motioned for him to come back in.
Having attempted to flee once, defendant
was at risk of doing so again if he was not
promptly taken into custody. Had he
escaped, the evidence of his crime would
have dissipated. Even if he had been
prevented from escaping, he had already

demonstrated plainly his desire to evade
police investigation and could have
corrupted the evidence simply by resuming
"828 drinking. The police thus had ample
cause to believe defendant was inside the
house and that the evidence was at risk of
imminent destruction, as the superior court
found. (Cf. Vale v. Louisiana (1970) 399
U.S. 30, 34-35, 90 S.Ct. 1969, 26 L.Ed.2d
409 [no exigency existed where the
officers had no basis for suspecting anyone
was inside the house or about to destroy
the narcotics].)
The Court of Appeal emphasized in
particular that the police had not conducted
a hot **I4 pursuit in that the pursuit was
initiated by a citizen and the police did not
observe defendant driving or entering the
house. Even if the definition of hot
pursuit were to exclude the situation here
(but see People v. Escudero (1979) 23
Cal.3d 800, 810, 153 Cal.Rptr. 825, 592
P.2d 312 ["it is not necessary that the
suspect be kept physically in view at all
times"] ), it is clear that defendant had
arrived at the house only minutes before
the police. The police thus had reasonable
cause to believe the evidence of
defendant's intoxication would be fresh at
the time of his arrest.
The intrusion on defendant's privacy, by
contrast, was a diminished one. Kovarick
had left the front door wide open during
the entire encounter. This not only
rendered a forcible entry unnecessary, but
it exposed to public view the very area
where the arrest would later occur. (Cf.
3aim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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U.S. v. Gori (2d Cir.2000) 230 F.3d 44, 53
["Once the apartment was opened to public
view by the defendants in response to the
knock of an invitee, there was no
expectation of privacy as to what could be
seen from the hall"]; U.S. v. Vaneaton (9th
Cir.1995) 49 F.3d 1423, 1427.)
Moreover, Officer Dejohn entered only a
few feet beyond the threshold, and Officer
Gutierrez followed only when it became
apparent that his assistance was necessary
to overcome defendant's resistance.
Neither conducted a search of the
residence. In short, the state's intrusion
into the home was the minimum necessary
to effect the arrest and extended only to
areas already exposed to public view.
Under these circumstances, it was
reasonable for the police to enter the home
without a warrant in order to arrest
defendant and thereby prevent the
imminent destruction of evidence of his
crime.FN3
FN3. To the extent dictum in
People v. Schofield, supra, 90
Cal.App.4th at pages 970 and 975,
109 Cal.Rptr.2d 429, is inconsistent
with the views expressed herein, it
is disapproved.
In light of our holding, we find it
unnecessary to address the People's
additional argument that even if the
warrantless entry had violated the Fourth
Amendment, the exclusionary rule would
not extend to the officers' observations of
defendant outside the house, any

statements defendant made prior to the
entry or after defendant was removed from
the house, or the results of his
blood-alcohol test. (See New York v.
Harris, supra, 495 U.S. at p. 19, 110 S.Ct.
1640; People v. Marquez (1992) 1 Cal.4th
553, 569, 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 710, 822 P.2d 418.)
*829 Disposition

The judgment of the Court of Appeal is
reversed.
***764 WE CONCUR: GEORGE, C.J.,
KENNARD, CHIN, MORENO, and
CORRIGAN, JJ.
Dissenting Opinion by WERDEGAR, J.
"A man's house is his castle." (Miller v.
United States (1958) 357 U.S. 301, 307, 78
S.Ct. 1190, 2 L.Ed.2d 1332.) This phrase
expresses the view that one's home is a
place of personal privacy and its
inhabitants are entitled to freedom from
govemmental intrusion absent a very good
reason. "At the risk of belaboring the
obvious, private residences are places in
which the individual normally expects
privacy free of governmental intrusion not
authorized by a warrant, and that
expectation is plainly one that society is
prepared to recognize as justifiable." (
United States v. Karo (1984) 468 U.S. 705,
714, 104 S.Ct. 3296, 82 L.Ed.2d 530,
quoted with approval in People v. Camacho
(2000) 23 Cal.4th 824, 831, 98
Cal.Rptr.2d 232, 3 P.3d 878.) "We have,
after all, lived our whole national history
with an understanding of 'the ancient
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adage that a man's home is his castle [to
the point that t]he poorest man may in his
cottage bid defiance to all the forces of the
Crown.' " (Georgia v. Randolph (2006) --U.S. ----,----,126 S.Ct. 1515, 1524, 164
L.Ed.2d 208.)
Not just some forgotten vestige of 15th
century English law that allowed English
peasants to assert their rights against a
powerful monarchy, the view that one's
home is a place of privacy was also shared
by the Framers of the United States
Constitution. We need not interpret or
gloss the constitutional text for hidden or
obscure meaning, for the drafters of the
Fourth Amendment made this point plain
on the face of the document: '"1.5 "The
right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated, and no warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause." (U.S.
Const., 4th Amend., italics added.)
The United States Supreme Court has
emphasized repeatedly the primacy of the
constitutional protection for persons in
their homes. " '[Plhysical entry of the
home is the chief evil against which the
wording of the Fourth Amendment is
directed.' " (Payton v. New York (1980)
445 U.S. 573, 585, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63
L.Ed.2d 639.) "At the very core [of the
Fourth Amendment] stands the right of a
man to retreat into his own home and there
be free from unreasonable governmental
intrusion." (Silverman v. United States
(1961) 365 U.S. 505, 511, 81 S.Ct. 679, 5

L.Ed.2d 734.) The high court has been
vigilant in extending this concept in the
face of new technological threats to the
sanctity of the home. (See Kyllo v. United
States (2001) 533 U.S. 27, 28, 121 S.Ct.
2038, 150 L.Ed.2d 94 [warrantless use of
"830 a thermal imaging device to explore
detdils inside home violated 4th Amend.];
United States v. Karo, supra, 468 U.S.
705, 104 S.Ct 3296, 82 L.Ed.2d 530
[warrantless placement of a beeper into a
home violated 4th Amend.].)
This court has also on numerous occasions
recognized this special constitutional
protection for persons in their homes. For
example, we held a warrantless search of a
suspect's home could not be justified by a
parole search condition of which police
were unaware (People v. Sanders (2003)
3 1 Cal.4th 3 18, 324, 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 630, 73
P.3d 496); that, absent more, the
warrantless entry into a suspect's home was
not justified solely by the arrest of the
suspect outside the home (People v. Celis
(2004) 33 Cal.4th 667, 676, 16 Cal.Rptr.3d
85, 93 P.3d 1027); that a person's
expectation of privacy in the home was not
compromised by his exposure of the
home's interior to a private side yard
***765(People v. Camacho, supra, 23
Cal.4th 824, 98 Cal.Rptr.2d 232, 3 P.3d
878);
and
that
the
presumptive
constitutional protection of the home
extended to an attached garage (People v.
Robles (2000) 23 Cal.4th 789, 795, 97
Cal.Rptr.2d 914, 3 P.3d 311; see Cal.
Const., art. I, $ 13). Perhaps our seminal
case in this area is People v. Ramey (1976)
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16 Cal.3d 263, 127 Cal.Rptr. 629, 545 P.2d
1333, where we held the warrantless entry
into a suspect's home to make an arrest,
even though supported by probable cause
to believe he was guilty of a felony, was
unreasonable per se under the Fourth
Amendment to the United States
Constitution and the state Constitution, at
least in the absence of exigent
circumstances. Four years later, the United
States Supreme Court came to this view
itself, holding in Payton v. New York that,
in the absence of exigent circumstances,
police entry into a suspect's home to arrest
him for a felony was "presumptively
unreasonable" in the absence of a warrant.
(Payton v. New York, supra, 445 U.S. at p.
587, 100 S.Ct 1371.)

I agree with the majority that Welsh v.
Wisconsin (1984) 466 U.S. 740, 104 S.Ct.
2091, 80 L.Ed.2d 732, wherein the high
court concluded the warrantless arrest of a
suspected d m & driver in his home was
invalid, may plausibly be distinguished
fiom the instant case on the ground the
crime at issue in that case was not a
jailable offense. (Maj. opn., ante, 43
Cal.Rptr.3d at pp. 756-757, 135 P.3d at pp.
8-9; Welsh v. Wisconsin, at pp. 742, 104
S.Ct. 2091 [emphasizing crime was "a
nonjailable traffic offense"], 753, 104 S.Ct.
2091 ["important factor" was "the gravity
of the underlying offense" and that crime
was "a noncriminal, traffic offense"].)
Welsh
is
But
even
assuming
distinguishable from the instant case on the
ground that incarceration is a possible
punishment for drunk driving in California,

I am not persuaded police were legally
entitled, on the facts of this case, to enter
defendant's home against his wishes
without a warrant. The majority concedes,
as it must, the Fourth Amendment's
presumptive protection of persons in their
homes, but reasons the warrantless entry
into this defendant's home was justified by
exigent circumstances. Because I disagree
such circumstances existed here, and
because I also find the majority's attempt to
circumscribe **I6 the sweep of its holding
unpersuasive, I dissent.

The ultimate standard established by the
Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution is one of reasonableness. (
Cady v. Dombrowski (1973) 413 U.S. 433,
439, 93 S.Ct. 2523, 37 L.Ed.2d 706.)
Beginning
with
the
unassailable
proposition that the warrantless entry by
government agents into a person's home is "
presumptively unreasonable " (Payton v.
New York, supra, 445 U.S. at p. 587, 100
S.Ct. 1371, italics added), courts have
nevertheless recognized some " '
specifically established and well-delineated
exceptions' to the warrant requirement (
Katz v. United States (1967) 389 U.S. 347,
357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576), such
as ' "hot pursuit of a fleeing felon, or
imminent destruction of evidence, ... or the
need to prevent a suspect's escape, or the
risk of danger to the police or to other
persons inside or outside the dwelling" ' (
Minnesota v. Olson (1990) 495 U.S. 91,
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100, 110 S.Ct. 1684, 109 L.Ed.2d 85)." (
People v. Celis, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p.
676, 16 Cal.Rptr.3d 85, 93 P.3d 1027.) "A
warrantless search by the police is invalid
unless it falls within one of the narrow and
well-delineated exceptions to the warrant
requirement." (Flippo v. West Virginia
(1999) 528 U.S. 11, 13, 120 S.Ct. 7, 145
L.Ed.2d 16; People v. Whnrton (1991) 53
Cal.3d 522, 576-577, 280 Cal.Rptr. 631,
809 P.2d 290 [same].)
***766 Once defendant demonstrated that
police entered his home without a warrant,
the burden shifted to the prosecution "to
prove that the entry was nevertheless
reasonable." (People v. Williams (1988)
45 Caf.3d 1268, 1300, 248 Cal.Rptr. 834,
756 P.2d 221.) Police admittedly did not
have an arrest warrant permitting them to
enter defendant's home and had been
expressly denied consent to enter by
defendant's housemate. (Georgia v.
Randolph, supra, --- U.S. ----,
126 S.Ct.
1515.) Although the majority hints
otherwise (maj. opn., ante, 43 Cal.Rptr.3d
at p. 763, 135 P.3d at p. 14), the forced
entry cannot be justified under the hot
pursuit doctrine, as "there was no
immediate or continuous pursuit ... from
the scene of the crime." (Welsh v.
Wisconsin, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 753, 104
S.Ct 2091.) Defendant had already
anived home, he was apparently sleeping
in his bedroom, and police were on the
scene; hence, "there was little remaining
threat to the public safety." (Ibid.)
The majority concludes the failure by

police to obtain. a warrant before entering
defendant's home is excused by the
exigent-circumstances exception to the
warrant requirement. " ' " '[Elxigent
circ&stancesl
means an emergency
situation requiring swift action to prevent
imminent danger or serious damage to
property, or to forestall the imminent
escape of a suspect or destruction of
evidence. There is no ready litmus test for
determining whether such circumstances
exist, and in each case the claim of an
extraordinary situation must be measured
by the facts known to the officers." '
[Citations.] The exception is applicable to
the federal Constitution (see "832Mincey
v. Arizona (1978) 437 U.S. 385, 98 S.Ct.
2408, 57 L.Ed.2d 290) and 'California
courts are in N1 accord with the ...
emergency exception to the warrant
requirement.' " (People v. Wharton, supra,
53 Cal.3d at p. 577, 280 Cal.Rptr. 631, 809
P.2d 290.)
"In evaluating exigency, relevant factors
"(1) the degree of urgency
include
involved and the amount of time necessary
to obtain a warrant; (2) reasonable belief
that the contraband is about to be removed;
(3) the possibility of danger to police
officers guarding the site of the contraband
while a search warrant is sought; (4)
information indicating the possessors of
the contraband are aware that the police are
on their trail; and (5) the ready
destructibility of the contraband and the
knowledge 'that efforts to dispose of
narcotics and to escape are characteristic
behavior of persons engaged in the
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narcotics traffic.' " ' " (People v. Gentry
(1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1255, 1261-1262, 9
Cal.Rptr.2d 742.)
The majority locates such an emergency
situation inside defendant's body, which
was slowly but inexorably metabolizing
and thus destroying the alcohol police
believed he had
consumed. The
emergency, in other words, involved the
potential destruction of the evidence of
defendant's crime of drunk driving. That
such "burn oft" occurs is undisputed. (
People v. Schofield (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th
968, 975, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 429; see **17In
re Martin (1962) 58 Cal.2d 509, 512, 24
Cal.Rptr. 833, 374 P.2d 801 ["It is a
matter of common knowledge that the
intoxicating effect of alcohol diminishes
with the passage of time"].) What is
disputed is whether this natural metabolic
process, standing alone, constitutes an
emergency such that police may dispense
with obtaining a warrant and immediately
enter a person's home against his will.
None of the cases on which the majority
relies supports its broad conclusion that the
natural metabolization of blood alcohol
alone constitutes an exigent circumstance
sufficient to permit police to enter a
person1s***767 home against his or her
wishes and without a warrant. For
example, in Schmerber v. California
(1966) 384 U.S. 757, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16
L.Ed.2d 908, the United States Supreme
Court cited the natural metabolization of a
body's blood alcohol to justify the police
taking a nonconsensual blood sample -from

a suspect notwithstanding the lack of a
search warrant. But the defendant in
Schmerber had already been arrested and
was in police custody, not in his home.
Moreover, the fact of the alcohol bum off
was just one factor the high court
considered: "We are told that the
percentage of alcohol in the blood begins
to diminish shortly after drinking stops, as
the body functions to eliminate it -from the
system. Particularly in a case such as
this, where time had to be taken to bring
the accused to a hospital and to investigate
the scene of the accident, there was no
time to seek out a magistrate and secure a
warrant. Given these special facts, we
conclude that the attempt to secure "833
evidence of blood-alcohol content in this
case was an appropriate incident to
petitioner's arrest." (Id. at pp. 770-771, 86
S.Ct. 1826, italics added.) No such time
pressures or "special facts" were shown in
the instant case; indeed, police were on
the scene just minutes after defendant
apparently had taken his last drink. (See
Vale v. Louisiana (1970) 399 U.S. 30, 35,
90 S.Ct. 1969, 26 L.Ed.2d 409 [in finding
no
exigent
circumstances,
court
emphasized absence of evidence showing
that obtaining a warrant was "impracticable

"I.)
Similarly, in Skinner v. Railway Labor
Executives' Assn. (1989) 489 U.S. 602, 109
S.Ct. 1402, 103 L.Ed.2d 639, the high
court merely recognized that "alcohol and
other drugs are eliminated -from the
bloodstream" (id. at p. 623, 109 S.Ct.
1402), a point no one disputes; it did not
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hold such elimination constituted an
exigent circumstance entitling police to
enter one's home without a warrant.
Instead, the court held the warrant
requirement was excused because the
government's interest in regulating railway
workers presented a special need beyond
normal law enforcement. (Id. at p. 620,
109 S.Ct. 1402.)

I

I

929 F.2d 990 in support (maj. opn., ante,
43 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 761, 135 P.3d at p.
12), but in both cases the defendants were
lawfully arrested outside the home, at the
scene of a traffic accident (Bohling ) or at a
traffic stop on the highway (Reid ); their
challenges were to the warrantless drawing
of a blood sample. The cases thus
presented a straightforward application of
Schmerber v. California, supra, 384 U.S.
757, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908, and
do not support the notion that the mere
dissipation***768
of
blood-alcohol
evidence, standing alone, creates such an
emergency that police may enter a
suspect's home without a warrant or
consent.

The majority opines that "most courts have
concluded that the dissipation of
blood-alcohol evidence 'may constitute an
exigent circumstance under the facts of a
particular case.' " (Maj. opn., ante, 43
Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 761, 135 P.3d at p. 12,
italics added.) The qualifiers are
important. The cases the majority cites in
support are all distinguishable. In City of
Orem v. Henrie (Utah Ct.App.1994) 868
P.2d 1384, the defendant was suspected
not only of driving while intoxicated, but
also of leaving the scene of an accident.
In State v. Komoto (1985) 40 Wash.App.
200, 697 P.2d 1025, the defendant struck
and killed a pedestrian. In both cases, the
blood-alcohol evidence was needed to
prosecute crimes far more serious than
mere driving under the influence (DUI).
The warrantless entry into a home may
therefore have been justified. Here, by
contrast, defendant was suspected only of
driving while intoxicated, and at the time
police entered his home any threat to
public safety had ceased.

**I8 *834 Finally, the majority cites
Threatt v. State (1999) 240 Ga.App. 592,
596, 524 S.E.2d 276, but that case held, on
facts similar to those here, that exigent
circumstances did not, in fact, exist to
authorize the warrantless entry to arrest for
the crime of reckless driving. The
Georgia appellate court then stated in
dictum
that-had
officers possessed
probable cause to arrest for DUI-the
dissipation of evidence "may constitute an
exigent circumstance." (Id. at p. 596, fn. 1,
524 S.E.2d 276, italics added.) In support,
the Threatt court cited State v. Tosar
(1986) 180 Ga.App. 885, 888, 350 S.E.2d
8 11, a case that did not involve entry into a
home.

The majority also cites State v. Bohling
(1993) 173 Wis.2d 529, 494 N.W.2d 399
and United States v. Reid (4th Cir.1991)

Invocation of the exigent-circumstances
exception to the warrant requirement,
moreover, must be supported by a showing
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of the "imminent destruction of evidence."
(Minnesota v. Olson, supra, 495 U.S. at p.
100, 110 S.Ct. 1684, italics added; see
also Brigham City v. Stuart (May 22, 2006,
NO. 05-502) --- U.S. ----,---- , 126 S.Ct.
1943, --- L.Ed.2d ----,
2006 WL 1374566,
*4 [destruction of evidence must be "
imminent"].) The prosecution made no
showing in this case that the delay in
obtaining a warrant would have resulted in
the imminent destruction, as opposed to the
gradual and incremental degradation, of
the alcohol in defendant's body. Indeed, a
delay of an hour or two to obtain a warrant
would have made little difference, for "[ilt
is common ... for experts to take into
account the metabolization rate of a
substance and extrapolate from the amount
of a substance in a blood sample to amve
at an opinion regarding the amount of the
substance in the blood at a critical point in
time." (People v. Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th
950, 993, 22 Cal.Rptr2d 689, 857 P.2d
1099.) The majority disparages the
retrograde
efficacy
of
so-called
extrapolation evidence, asserting such
evidence " 'can be speculative' " (maj.
opn., ante, 43 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 761, 135
P.3d at p. 12), but surely it does not mean
to suggest the admissibility of this type of
evidence is suspect. In any event, the rule
in this state (People v. Clark, supra, 5
Cal.4th 950, 22 Cal.Rptr.2d 689, 857 P.2d
1099)
and, indeed, in the majority of
jurisdictions,
is
that
retrograde
extrapolation evidence is admissible,
though of course its weight is subject to
challenge, as are the qualifications of the
expert witness presenting the evidence.

(See generally Annot., Admissibility and
Sufficiency of Extrapolation Evidence in
DUI Prosecutions (2004) 119 A.L.R.5th
379.)
FN1. See also Vehicle Code section
23 152, subdivision (b) which states
in part: "In any prosecution under
this subdivision, it is a rebuttable
presumption that the person had
0.08 percent or more, by weight, of
alcohol in his or her blood at the
time of driving the vehicle if the
person had 0.08 percent or more,
by weight, of alcohol in his or her
blood at the time of the
performance of a chemical test
within three hours after the driving.
3,

To further support its contention the
exigent-circumstances doctrine applies
here, the majority relies on the possibility
defendant could have corrupted the
evidence of his alcohol consumption by
consuming more alcohol. (Maj. opn., ante,
43 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 762, 135 P.3d at p.
13.) But this argument proves too much,
for the possibility exists in every case that
a criminal suspect in his home will try to
destroy evidence "835 of his crime. The
drug dealer may flush his stash away, the
bookie may burn his betting slips, the killer
may take a metal file to the barrel of his
gun or clean his hands of gunshot residue.
The mere possibility a defendant may drink
additional quantities of liquor is
insufficient
to
overcome
the
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constitutionallyprotected***769
privacy
interests of a person in his home. Instead,
police must have articulable facts that
would lead a reasonable officer to believe
such destruction is about to occur. " ' "
[Flear or apprehension alone that evidence
will be destroyed will not justify a
warrantless entry of a private home."
[Citation.] Instead, "[tlhere must exist '
specific and articulable facts which, taken
together with rational inferences ...,'
support the warrantless intrusion." ' " (
People v. Gentry, supra, 7 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1262,9 Cal.Rptr.2d 742.)
Vale v. Louisiana, supra, 399 U.S. 30, 90
S.Ct. 1969, 26 L.Ed.2d 409, illustrates this
basic point of law. In that case, after
police arrested the defendant outside a
home, they entered the home without a
warrant to search for drugs. The
Louisiana Supreme Court upheld the
search, in part, because the crime "
involved narcotics, which are easily **I9
removed, hidden, or destroyed. It would
be unreasonable, the Louisiana court
concluded, 'to require the officers under
the facts of the case to first secure a search
warrant before searching the premises, as
time is of the essence inasmuch as the
officers never know whether there is
anyone on the premises to be search [ed]
who could very easily destroy the evidence.
' " (Id. at p. 34, 90 S.Ct. 1969.) The
United States Supreme Court flatly
rejected the state court's reasoning,
explaining: "Such a rationale could not
apply to the present case, since by their
own account the arresting officers satisfied

themselves that no one else was in the
house when they first entered the premises.
But entirely apart from that point, our
past decisions make clear that only in 'a
few
specifically
established
and
well-delineated' situations [citation] may a
warrantless search of a dwelling withstand
constitutional scrutiny." (Ibid.) Because
there was no evidence someone was about
to remove or destroy evidence, the high
court held the exigent-circumstances
exception did not apply.
As in Vale v. Louisiana, supra, 399 U.S.
30, 90 S.Ct. 1969, 26 L.Ed.2d 409, the
prosecution in this case presented no
evidence suggesting defendant was about
to alter evidence of his guilt by drinking
again. Neither Officer Gutierrez nor
Dejohn observed defendant drinking, or
attempting to drink, any intoxicating
beverage. Witness Madelene Orvos
reported that defendant had discarded an
empty bottle of vodka. Defendant's
housemate, Slavka Kovarick, told police
defendant was sleeping, which was
apparently the case until police instructed
her to awaken him. Although the majority
opines that "[tlhe officers had good reason
to believe that defendant ... would ... act to
conceal his intoxication if given the
(maj. opn., ante, 43
opportunity"
Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 762, 135 P.3d at p. 13),
the record confirms police possessed no
articulable facts suggesting defendant was
actively corrupting, or about to corrupt, the
blood-alcohol evidence by resuming his
consumption of alcohol. By accepting in
support of exigency the argument "836
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that defendant could corrupt the evidence,
the majority converts the narrow
exigent-circumstances exception to the
constitutional warrant requirement into a
free pass for police: So long as the
destruction of evidence is possible, police
may dispense with a warrant. But the
possibility a suspect will destroy evidence
exists in every case; that possibility thus
cannot be the predicate for invoking the
nmow exigent-circumstances exception to
the constitutional requirement for a
warrant. (Cf. People v. Gonzalez (1989)
21 1 Cal.App.3d 1043, 1050, 259 Cal.Rptr.
846 ["If specific indications of ...
destruction of evidence were not required,
the exigent-circumstances exception would
entirely consume" the knock-notice
requirement].)
***770 Realizing, perhaps, that none of its
previous rationales adequately justify the
warrantless entry, the majority suggests
defendant had attempted to flee. (Maj.
opn., ante, 43 Cal.Rptr.3d at pp. 762-763,
135 P.3d at pp. 13-14.) This suggestion
finds no support in the record. Officer
Dejohn testified defendant, on learning
police were on his doorstep, left his house
by the back door, walked about 10 feet into
the backyard, and then returned to the
house. Although this caused Dejohn to be
concerned defendant would flee, he
admitted defendant was so intoxicated that
he was staggering and slurring his words
and that he immediately returned to the
house. But even assuming defendant
might have attempted to flee, that
possibility did not create an emergency

situation justifying the warrantless entry.
Police at the scene could easily have
detained him while they sought a warrant.
In any event, the prosecution did not argue
below that defendant's asserted attempt to
flee created an emergency situation, and
the trial court did not mention this
circumstance.
The
court
denied
defendant's suppression motion solely on
the ground that his body's metabolization
of alcohol in his blood constituted the
destruction of evidence. (See Lorenzana v.
Superior Court (1973) 9 Cal.3d 626,
640-641, 108 Cal.Rptr. 585, 511 P.2d 33
[People cannot change theory on appeal of
suppression decision].)
Finally, the majority attempts to minimize
the scope of its holding, explaining that it
does not decide "that police may enter a
home without a warrant to effect an arrest
of a DUI suspect in every case. We hold
merely **20 that the police conduct here,
taking into account all of the
circumstances, was reasonable...." (Maj.
opn., ante, 43 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 762, 135
P.3d at p. 13.) I find the majority's
attempt to circumscribe the sweep of its
holding
both
unpersuasive
and
disingenuous. What are the circumstances
in this case that make it unusual? Police
had probable cause to believe defendant
had recently become intoxicated and had
driven home and that he was now inside
his house. Police lacked both a warrant
and consent to enter. Defendant's body was
naturally metabolizing the alcohol, but that
would be true in every crime involving
alcohol. Defendant
might
consume
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additional alcohol, thereby corrupting the
evidence, but that. possibility, too, would
exist in every case involving an
alcohol-related crime. Police, in any
event, had no articulable facts to suggest
defendant was about to drink anything.
Under the majority's reasoning, "837
therefore, it would appear that any time
police have probable cause to arrest
someone for an alcohol-related crime (for
which the possible penalty involves some
jail time) and they reasonably believe the
suspect is in his home, they may forcibly
enter without a warrant to make an arrest
to preserve the blood-alcohol evidence.
One can only hope the majority's reasoning
today is akin to "a restricted railroad ticket,
good for this day and train only." (Smith v.
Allwright (1944) 321 U.S. 649, 669, 64
S.Ct. 757, 88 L.Ed. 987 (dis. opn. of
Roberts, J.).)

That those enforcing our criminal laws will
proceed vigorously is generally to society's
benefit, but the Fourth Amendment to the
United
States
Constitution
places
reasonable and recognizable limits on such
activities. One such limit is that the
warrantless entry into an individual's home
is presumptively unreasonable unless
justified by one of the narrow exceptions to
the warrant requirement. By requiring, in
all other situations, the interposition of the
considered judgment of a neutral
magistrate, the Constitution protects the
citizenry's reasonable expectation of

privacy in their homes. As Justice Robert
Jackson ***771 explained: "The point of
the Fourth Amendment, which often is not
grasped by zealous officers, is not that it
denies law enforcement the support of the
usual inferences which reasonable men
draw from evidence. Its protection
consists in requiring that those inferences
be drawn by a neutral and detached
magistrate instead of being judged by the
officer engaged in the often competitive
enterprise of ferreting out crime. Any
assumption that evidence sufficient to
support a magistrate's
disinterested
determination to issue a search warrant
will justify the officers in making a search
without a warrant would reduce the
Amendment to a nullity and leave the
people's homes secure only in the
discretion of police officers. Crime, even
in the privacy of one's own quarters, is, of
course, of grave concern to society, and the
law allows such crime to be reached on
proper showing. The right of officers to
thrust themselves into a home is also a
grave concern, not only to the individual
but to a society which chooses to dwell in
reasonable security and freedom from
surveillance. When the right of privacy
must reasonably yield to the right of search
is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial
officer, not by a policeman or Government
enforcement agent." (Johnson v. United
States (1948) 333 U.S. 10, 13-14, 68 S.Ct.
367, 92 L.Ed. 436.)
*838 The majority endorses a scheme
today by which police may too easily
evade the warrant requirement. Because I
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conclude its reasoning and result are
contray to the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution, I dissent.
Ca1.,2006.
People v. Thompson
38 Cal.4th 811, 135 P.3d 3, 43 Cal.Rptr.3d
750, 06 Cal. Daily Op. Sew. 4587, 2006
Daily Joumal D.A.R. 6776
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The state has abandoned the reason initially offered as a cdtutit)nal excuse for entering
the Appellant's home wiwithoul awarrmt, and now advocates aresult-oriented alternative that would
have the Court re-create the reaiity of what occurred The pol~ceoficms involved did not arrest the
Appellant when they entered her home. They were still invesligating the case. Once she was
removed from her home she was forced to perform field sobriety evaluations and submit to a breath
test at the threat of the loss of her license. If probable cause existed form mest prim to entry inlo

hcr home, as the state now contends, then she should have been told she was under arrest, at which
I

I

point she was entitled to be told she had the right to an attorney, the right to remain silent and the

7X NO.

:2086643644

right in refuse to allswer the officer's quest~ons.Thc state's position, if accepied by i11eCourt,

allows the state the freedom to make a warrantless entry into a home under a prohble cause to
arresffexigent circucnstances theory made up afler the fact, and at the same time ignore the
constitutional protections available to one aocusod of a crime. Such an in~o~~gruous
result should
not he allowed, and the Court should simply ref7~1sc
to engage in the almost mystical distinctions

between "reasonable, articulablc suspicion of' criminal activity" and "probable cime" to arrest.
The fact is that the police did not onter the Appcllant'shome to arrest her. They entered her

bume, based upon a T e r y style stop to continue their investigation. As the state now concedes

Tdnho law does not allow police entry into the home to effect u Terry seizure, and this warmnt1es.s
entry was therefore unconstitutional.
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for argument on appeal
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Courtroom: Courtroom1

Other: Fred Loats, DA
Ready
Other: Ann Wick, PA
Ready
Judge: Luster, John
I have reviewed briefing
Other: Fred Loats, DA
Officers responded to a call re: argument
between son and mother (my client)
argument was about her drinking. At that time
Def drove up brief contact
wth her -told her to drive further up the drive
way and to step out of the
vehicle and stay there. He spoke to son - she
went into her home. TWO
offices went inside her house and took her
outside and continued with DUI
investigation. I challenge the entry into the
liome. The state's position
now is that they had probable cause so no need
to worry about Terry or Maland
or exigent circumstances. 116 SCt. 1667 Page
1661 Maland says you can't do
that (enter the home) to make the arrest. The
officers didn't arrest her
when they went into the home. They did take her
into custody.

-

Judge: Luster, John
There are minutes in the file of Judge
Friedlander intidcating probable cause
to arrest -the minutes don't reflect "exigent
circumstances."
Other: Fred Loats, DA
There was no additional evidence taken. I don't
recall if she discussed
exigent circumstances or not.
Judge: Luster, John
The only thing in the court log is one line "find PC for DUI' I'm not sure
that is part of the appellate record. Arguing
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17:09:33
17:09:57
17:10:15
17:10:49
7

I :2

17:11:57
17:12:16
17:12:27
17:12:50
17:13:17
17:132 1
17:13:42

PC is argument in futility state will argue yes and I'll argue no. The
order to continue to drive is
inconsistent with believing she was DUI. When
they removed her from the home
they questioned her about what had happened.
They didn't tell her those
things (rights)because they didn't think she
was DUI. The case should be
strictly analyzed under Maland. - this is
directly on point.

Other: Ann Wick, PA
Appropriate to look at how we got where we did.
He's raised the issue under
lower court re: Maiand and that's where all the
arguments stem fiom and have
him arguing Maland vs. what my brief is - I
don't think that Maland is
controlling. Judge found the stop was
effectuated outside the home. She was
told to sit on the bench outside the home and
she did this for a short time
and then she went inside the home. The police
did not enter the home to
effectuate a Terry stop.

17:14,57

Judge: Luster, John
Questions PA re: difference in case and Maland

17:15.19

Other: Ann Wick, PA
The Terry stop is a seizure - we're looking at a
warrantless entry into a hom
loolc at exigent circumstances exception.

17:16 49
17:19:41
17:19:58
17:20:22
17:20:38
17:2 1 :01

Judge: Luster, John
There is no evidence of any violence -just that
the argument was over the
mother drinking and possibly driving.
Othcr: Ann Wick, PA
The second officer who arrived is not the one
who was talking to the son
and didn't have full information -only the
domestic disturbance report and
some ofwhat the first officer knows.
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Judge: Luster, John
I'm not sure Judge Friedlander evaluated the
case it1 the same fashion you
have and I dont' think I saw anything in the
record that any officer was
concerned about losing evidence and obtaining a
warrant.
Other: Ann Wick, PA
The lower court was dealing with issues as
represented by the parties -that
doesn't inhibit the court from ruling on the
Magistrate decision as argued
Sufficient facts on the record that exigent
circ~inistancesapply
Judge: Luster, John
The state did not come forward and put evidence
on the record re: exigent
circumstances. No problem with your legal
analysis. Welch case is no longer
controlling due to law changing State v. Fees
is controlling
Other: Fred Loats, DA
Judge Friedlander based her decision on the Fees
issue. State v. Jenkins
didn't change her mind in Motion for
reconsideration. Zuniga - court of
appeals decision re: seizure remarkably
siniilar to ours Judge: Luster, John
Recess to review language in one of the cases.
Stop recording

Recording Started:
Record
FINNICUM, PEGGY JEAN
Judge: Luster, John
Baclc in session - dealing with a Magistrate
division appeal -re: appeal
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standards - facts are basically undisputed the findings of the Magistrate
ae very limited in this case and this is
problematic. The matter came on
befoe the Magistrate for Reconsideration and the
motion was denied - the
record is somewhat limited. I see that the
Judge found probable cause
without other findings. State v. Maland
application issue - I respectfully
disagree with her conclusion the real question
is warrantless entry into
the home. There must be probable cause and
exigent circumstances. Conclude
that a criminal act justifying entry into a home
misdemeanor DUI clearly
qualifies as a serious offense. Next there must
be probable cause objective standard - Judge Friedlander didn't
iteniize the reasons for finding
PC. The evidence that the court would have to
consider is collective
informaton of officers before entry into the
home. Son's information was
corroborated to some extent when the defendant
arrived and officers saw
slurred speach, eyes glossy, odor of alcohol.
The officer did articulate on
2 occasions that he told defendant that he felt
she was under the influence not that he suspected it. His wanting additonal
evidence does not diminish.
that opinion. The purpose on appeal is if there
is sufficient findings on
the record from the Magistrate that the officer
had PC. I am prepared to
find that the officer had PC. The next prongis
exigent circumstances - the
one the officer indicated is officer safety.
The facts of that in this case
is simply lacking. The Supreme Court decided on
a case this week - name
~~nltnown
- re Officers Safety. Call was as to a
domestic disturbance - when
they got there and spoke to the son it was
different - that there was a

-
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heated argument over her drinking habits.
Exigent circumstances not
justified. PA Swenson argued destruction of
evidence. I found this
interesting that they made no effort to knock on
the door and ask her to come
out - they simply walked into the home. There
was no testimony about the
officers concern of alcohol blood level drop,
undue delay in obtaining a
warrant, more alcohol in the house or officer's
concern. The district court
lnust determine that the record shows sufficient
finding to support - they
were simply not advanced. It is clearly the
burden of the state to establish
the appropriate - did re: PC but not as to
exigent circumstances. REVERSE
THE DECISION OF MAGISTRATE DIVISION AND REMAND
BACK DA to submit order
Other: Fred Loats, DA
1'11 do so
17:58:20

Other: Ann Wick, PA
1s tlle court not'finding state v. Cooper that

17:58:59
1759: 12

the exigent circumstances of
blood alcohol is sufficient?

17:59:26

Judge: Luster, John
There needs to be something for the record and
exigent circumstances needs to
be more than blood alcohol level

18:00:00

Stop recording
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STATE OF IDAHO,
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PEGGY JEAN FINNICUM,
Defendant.
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1
1
1
1
1
1

CASE NO. CR05-19431
OBJECTION TO DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED
ORDER ON APPEAL

ANN WICK, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for Kootenai County, Idaho, hereby objects to
Defendant's proposed Order on Appeal, for the following reasons:
1. Defendant's proposed order does not clearly set forth the findings made by the Court

on the record on February 1,2007. Without at least a summary of the Court's
findings and conclusions on the record, in the absence of a transcript of the appeal
hearing, the magistrate court is given no guidance as to what proceedings are
appropriate on remand.
2. Defendant's proposed order does not accurately reflect the Court's order to remand.
The Court reversed the magistrate court's decision denying Defendant's Motion to
Suppress and remanded this case to the Magistrate's Division for further proceedings
consistent with the Court's decision. To the best of the undersigned counsel's
recollection, the Court did not order that the Judgment and Sentence in this case be

set aside. Nor did the Court remand the case with specific instmctions for the
magistrate court to grant Defendant's Motion to Suppress.
Accordingly, the State requests the Court sign the State's proposed Order on Appeal,
which is attached. In the alternative, a hearing is requested in order for the State to present oral
argument in support of this Objection. If such hearing is granted, the State expects oral argument
to take approximately fifteen minutes.

"J

Dated this $
- day of

a-

,2007.

/

Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

_FA.

I hereby certify that on the&
day of
, 2007, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing OBJECTION TO DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED ORDER was sent first class mail to :
Fred Loats, Attorney for Defendant
Fax: 208-664-3644
I
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STATE OF IDAHO, iTJ AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

1

STATE OF IDAHO,

)

Plaiilti,fT,

1
1
)

VS.

1
PEGGY JEAN PlNNICO'M,

Case No. CR-2005-001943I
,

MOTION FOR R;FCONSIDERATlON
NOTICE OF HENUNG

)

1
Defendant.

1

Defendant hereby moves the Court for reconsideration of its decisicm denying the
Defendant's Moljon to Suppress, upon the grounds and for the reasons set forth in the accompanying

,,

Memorandum.

Counsel intend9 lo call this Motion on for hea~ingon 2hc. 2 12: day of February, 2006 at h e
hour nT8:30 o'clock a.m.,the time set for Calendar Call, or at such othertime ~ls
the Courlmay set
,

or allow.

,

. ,

I.::

.,

. ..

.: _ .

..

Counsel requests the opportunity to make oral argument. in
, support
..
ofthis Motion.
.i.

,.(,

MOTrON FOR ROCC0NJrUEHH4TI0N,
NOTICE 0FHEAR1,'NT: 1

..,.:

:

pi:

ROM :FRED LOQTS OFFICE

DATED this

FQX NO. :

day &February, 2006.

~Ggrney
for Defendant
.. . .
,....,

I hereby ccrtiiy that on the 3 day of February, 2006, a true and cormd copy of the
forcgo~ngwas sewed upon counsel For the statc,by sending the same by Wx to the Kootenai County
Prosecuting Attorney's Office, at 4446- 1833.
A

Attorney for Drferuiant
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(N T I E DISTRICT COURT OF 'SHE FmST JTJDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

STATE OF IDAHO, TN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
STATE OF DAHO,
Plaintifi;
vs
PEGGY JEAN FINNTCUM,

Defendant.

)
)

1
1

Case No. CR-2005-001943 I

)

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR MCONSIDEKATZON

1
)

)
)

In its decision, the Court found that a ''Teri-y" stop had occurred outside the Defendant's
rcsidcnce, and therefore the decision in State v. Maland was distinguishable from the facts of this

case, and that w e v , Manthei, allowing police entry into n home to complete a "Terry" stop, was

In California v.

., 499 1J.S. 621,

111 S.Ct. 1547 (1991). the Court held .that a

"seizure" within "the m.eaningol'the Foc~rihAmendment", did hot.':dccuruntil the defen.danlhad
actually been taken into physical police custody. 'The defendant was among a group of young men

.

.

that "scattered" upon seeing a poi~oecar. The police gave chase. During the chase, the ciefe~~dant

?OM :FRED LORTS OFFICE

discarded a package which lafer turned out to contain L T W ~cocaine. ,The officer then tackled the
defendant. E,k later filed a Motion to Suppress, contending that hh had been "seized'" under the
Fourth Amendment when pursued by the police (and presumiibly
.

,

to stop). The state conceded
,

that the oftrcers laclced the reasonable suspicion necessary for ileditimate Torry stop. Tho Comt
held that no seizurc for Fourth Amendment purposes occiured until tho defendant way a~3ually
physically taken into police custody ("seized"), and therefore it was unnecctsaiyto consider whether
the police had constitutional grounds to chase the defendant, as the crack cocaine, discarded in
flight, was not acquired by the police as the rcsult of an unconstitutional "seizure."
"Thc narrow question before us is whether, with respect to a show of authority as with
respect to application of physical force, aseizure occurs even thoughthe subject does not yield. We
hold that it does not." California d d a r i D., 111 S.Ct. 1547 at 1550.
Application ofpodarito the facts ofthiv case leads to the ctbnclusion that no '"sei!zure" of
Mrs. Finnicum occurred until &er the police entered her home and escorted her back oulside. In
other words, no "Twry" stop was effectuated outside the home, thereby bringing this cave within
the ruling of the Court in Btate v. Mak& and outside the parameters of State v.,-.

if that

case is still good law. A seizure does not occur, under the Fourth Amendment, when thc "subject
does not yield." Mrs. Finnicum did not yield, but walked inside her home. Under the definition of
I.,

.

.

"seizure" given in t h e m c a s e , no Terry stop was "effectuated" until the police walked inside
i

.:, .

her home and physically escorted her out. Maland held such an entry is unconstitutional, md
therefore the Motion to Supprcss should have been granted.

Tt is therefore respectfully requested that the: Court reconsider its earlier decision and grant
MEMORAM,rIM INSUPPORT OF

MOTION FOR RECONSIDEHATION

2

RON :FRED LORTS OFFICE

FR><NO. :

the Motion to Suppmss ,filedheroin.

.. ~. , . .

.

Attorney for Defendant

Q3RWlCAT'E%OF SERVICE

1

I hereby certify that on the
day o f February. 2006, a true and conect cupy of the
forego~ngwas served upon cou~lselfor the state, by sending the same by fax lo the Kootenai County
Prosecuting Attorney's Office, at 446-1 833.
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FRE'DERTCKa LUATS

Attornqy m Law
,111 North 2nd Sweet
1'. 0.Box 831
Cwur d'Alene,lL) 83HI4

lklcphone (208)667-6424
Fax: (208)664-3644
ISB No.2147

Attorney for Defendant-Appellant

INI'IIEDISTRICT COURT OF W,FIRST JUDJCIAL DISTRTCT CIX: nB
STATE3 OF lDAIiO, M AND FOR T m COUNTY OF KOOThiAI
S T A m OF IDAHO,

)

1

Plaintiff-Respondent, )

1
j

vs.

Case No. CR-2005-0019431

ORDER ON APPEAL

PEWY JEAN F W C U M ,
I

Defendant-Appellant. )

L
Oral argument in this matter was heard on February I., 2007. After considering the
armments of oounsel, the Brief$ filed, m d the reoord on appeal, the Court having announced its

Pindings of Fact and ConoIusj,onsof Law on the record ar the conclusion 0.foral argument,
SS IS HEREBY ORDERED that che Judgment and Senktloc entered in the above entitled
action be m a t e d and set asidide, and the Order Denying the Defendant's Motion to Suppress be
reversed, and mamr remandcd to Magistrate's Division with instructions to gran.t the Defendant's
Motion to Supprcss and for such further prooeedings consixtent with the Court's decision reversing
tho Order Denying the Motion to Suppress.

Received

Feb-05-07

02:57um

From-20866A36AA

To-JUDGE LUSTER

PI

FRX NO.

FROM :FRED LOATS OFFICE

:2086643644

ab. 05 2007 01:46PM

P2

4
P
Dated this?... day o f Pebrunry, 2007,

DI.drIct Judge

1

CERTIFICATE OF SERVlCl3
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fax to the o f i m of the Kuotcnai County
Lon&, attorney for Defendant-Appellant,
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STATE OF IDAHO,
)

CASE NO. C'RO5-19431

)

ORDER ON APPEAL

Plaintiff,
VS.

PEGGY JEAN FINNICUM,
Defendant.

)
)

The Court heard oral argument in the above-entitled case on Defendant's appeal of the
magistrate court's decision denying Defendant's Motion to Suppress on February 1,2007. At
the conclusion of the hearing, the Court announced its decision reversing the magistrate court's
decision on the record and remanded the case to the Magistrate's Division for M h e r
proceedings. So that the magistrate court has some guidance as to what further proceedings are
appropriate on remand, the Court now summarizes its decision on the record as follows:
The issue before the Court on appeal was whether or not the warrantless entry into Ms.
Finnicum's house by law enforcement fell within a well-recognized exception to the general
Constitutional warrant requirement. The State argued that said entry fell within the exigent
circumstances exception, based both on a concern that Defendant would be able to obtain a
weapon from within the home and on the dissipating nature of blood alcohol content evidence.
While this Court does find that driving under the influence is clearly a serious offense for
purposes of applying the exigent circumstances analysis to a case involving evanescent evidence,
and that evanescent evidence could present an exigent circumstance, this Court cannot find that

the exigent circumstances exception has been factually supported in the present case.
Specifically, the record contains no evidence as to the time it would have taken to get a search
warrant for Ms. Finnicum's home, the possible presence of alcohol in the home, or the problems
presented by waiting for a search warrant to be obtained. Furthermore, the facts known to the
officers when they gained entry into Ms. Finnicum's house are insufficient to support a finding
of exigency based on a weapons concern.
For the foregoing reasons, and the reasons stated on the record on February 1,2007,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the magistrate court's decision denying Defendant's
Motion to Suppress is reversed, and that the matter is remanded to the Magistrate's Division for
further proceedings consistent with this decision.
Dated this!@?ay

of

F&ruar,

\,

,2007.
The Honorable John P. Luster
District Judge
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR KOOTENAI C O U N N

1

STATE OF IDAHO

1
Plaintiff-Appellant,

j

NO. CR 2005-0019431

1

i

vs.

)

PEGGY J W N FINNICUM,
Defendant-Respondent.

NOTICE OF APPEAL

1

i

)
)

TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENT, PEGGY JE%N FINNICUM,
AND FREDERICK G. LOATS, ATTORNEY AT LAW, P.O. BOX 831,COEUR
D'ALENE, IDAHO 83816, AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED
COURT:
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:

1.

The State of ldaho appeals against the above-named respondent,

Peggy Jean Finnicum, to the ldaho Supreme Court from the Order On Appeal
entered in the above-entitled action on February 12, 2007,and the Order On

-

NOTICE OF APPEAL Page I

Appeal entered in the above-entitled action on February 26, 2007, the Honorable
Judge John Patrick Luster, presiding.
2.

That the party has a right to appeal to the ldaho Supreme Court,

and the orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable orders under
ldaho Appellate Rule 11(c)(10).
3.

The appellant requests the preparation of the following portions of

the reporter's transcript, in compressed form as described in I.A.R. 26(m):
a) The hearing on appeal before the district court on February 1, 2007.

4.

The appellant requests the following document be included in the

clerks record, in addition to those automatically included under I.A.R. 28:
a) The transcript of the hearings on the motion to suppress held in
this case on December 15,2005 and February 3, 2008, which
have already been prepared as one volume and submitted and
considered by the district court at the 2/1/07 hearing on appeal.
5.

1 certify that:

a) A copy of this notice of appeal is being served on the reporter;
b) The appellant is exempt from paying the estimated fee for the
preparation of the record because the State of ldaho is the
appellant (Idaho Code 5 31-3212);
c) There is no appellate filing fee since this is an appeal in a
criminal case, I.A.R. 23(a)(8);

-
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d) That arrangements have been made with the Kootenai County

Prosecuting Attorney who will be responsible for paying for the
reporter's transcript;:
e) Service is being made upon all parties as required by I.A.R. 20.

6.

The issue on appeal is whether the district court erred in reversing

the magistrate's denial of Rnnicum's motion to suppress.
DATED this 23* day of March, 2007.

Deputy Attorney General
Attorney for the Appellant
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

1
1

Case No. CR05-19431

)

REMITTITUR

1
1

PEGGY JEAN FINNICUM,
Defendant.

\

The appeal court having rendered it's decision and the time for appeal having
expired now, therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the same is hereby remanded to the Magistrate
Division for such further proceedings as may be necessary.
DATED this li,qthday of M o d ,

,2007

I?&&

District Judge

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed,
postage prepaid, on the
day d&WiL
,2007, to the following:

Honorable Penny Friedlander
Magistrate
FAX 446-1188
KCPA
FAX 446-1833
Fred Loats
FAX 664-3644

DAN ENGLISH, Clerk of Court

Ash- ~3~44.4~
Deputy Clerk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

I
I

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

CASE NO. CR-05-19431
ORDER RESCINDING REMITTITUR

PENNY JEAN FINNICUM,

I

Defendant.

The District Court issued its Remittitur on March 29, 2007 after
ruling on appeal from the Magistrate Division. A Notice of Appeal from
the District Court's decision was filed o n March 23, 2007, however that
Notice had not been placed in the court file.
Therefore it is hereby ordered that the Remittitur remanding the
matter to the Magistrate Division is rescinded.

Dated this 5th day of April, 2007

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, postage prepaid,
interoffice, or faxed on the 5'h day of April, 2007, to the following:
Honorable Penny Friedlander
Magistrate
FAX: 446-1 188
KCPA
FAX: 446-1833
Fred Loats
FAX: 664-3644
Dan English
Clerk of the Court
Deputy Clerk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JTJDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff/Respondent

)
)
)

SUPREME COURT
CASE NUMBER
34087
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE

I

PEGGY JEAN FINNICUM
Defendant/Appellant

)
)

I CINDY O'REILLY Clerk of the District Court of the First
Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of
Kootenai, do hereby certify that the foregoing Record in this
cause was compiled and bound under my direction and is a true,
correct and complete Record of the pleadings and documents
requested by Appellate Rule 28.
I further certify that the following will be submitted as
exhibits to this Record on Appeal:
TRANSCRIPT: MOTION TO SUPPRESS AND DECISION FILED 9/14/06
PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT #1

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed
the seal of the said Court this 5THday of JUNE 2007.
Clerk of the District Court
DAN ENGLISE.
By:
Clerk's Certificate

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

State of Idaho
PlaintifflRespondent

VS

PEGGY JEAN FINNICUM
DefendantIAppellant

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

SUPREME COURT #34087
CASE #CR05-1943 1
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Cindy O'Reilly, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the First Judicial District
Of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Kootenai, do hereby certify that I have
personally served or mailed, by United States Mail, one copy of Clerk's Record to
each of the attorneys of record in this cause as follows:
FREDERICK LOATS
ATTORNEY AT LAW
111 ~
2
~
~
PO BOX 83 1
COEUR D'ALENE ID 83814
Attorney for Appellant

IN WITNESS
Said Court this@ d

~

t

Mr. Lawrence Wasden
Attorney General
State of Idaho
700 W. Jefferson
Suite 210
Boise ID 83720-0010
Attorney for Respondent

ave hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of
,2008
Dan English
Clerk of District Court

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

